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FEDERAL CONTROL OF CARBON DIOXIDE 
EMISSIONS: WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS? 
Arnold W. Reitze, Jr.* 
Abstract: The U.S. Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA held that 
carbon dioxide is a pollutant under the Clean Air Act (CAA) and re-
manded the case to EPA. The Agency must decide whether CO2 emissions 
contribute to climate change. If the Agency responds affirmatively, it must 
meet other requirements of the CAA in order to regulate carbon dioxide 
or other greenhouse gases (GHGs). This Article explains why the CAA is 
a poor vehicle for regulating GHGs and covers in detail the difficulties 
that will arise in trying to use the Act to reduce CO2 emissions. The 
Article then turns to what should be done to develop an energy policy 
that will effectively reduce U.S. GHG emissions. It examines the options 
for control, including the use of taxes and cap-and-trade programs and 
evaluates some of the most important legislative proposals being consid-
ered. It then turns to the two major sources of GHGs—electric power 
production and motor vehicle use—and addresses how the adverse 
impact these sources have on our climate could be reduced. 
Introduction 
 The United States Supreme Court, in Massachusetts v. EPA, in a five 
to four decision, held that carbon dioxide (CO2) qualifies as an air pol-
lutant under section 302(g) of the Clean Air Act (CAA).1 Proponents of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) regulation, since the Rio de Janeiro Confer-
ence in 1992, have been seeking, without success, to obtain congres-
sional and administration support for both international treaties and 
domestic legislation that mandate GHG emission reductions. From 
1999 to the date of the Court’s decision, more than 200 bills were in-
troduced in Congress to regulate GHGs, but none were enacted.2 The 
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petitioners were asking the Court to give them through litigation what 
they had failed to achieve from lobbying the legislative or the executive 
branch, and they were successful.3 
 The majority opinion determined GHGs are air pollutants based 
on section 302(g) of the CAA and then addressed the issue of whether 
EPA properly refused to exercise its authority to regulate CO2, the most 
important GHG emitted in the U.S., pursuant to section 202(a)(1) of 
the CAA.4 The Court held that, “EPA can avoid taking further action 
only if it determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate 
change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it can-
not or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do.”5 
The Court went on to say EPA cannot refuse to regulate because of its 
concerns over scientific uncertainty or because of the implications con-
cerning foreign affairs.6 “The statutory question is whether sufficient 
information exists to make an endangerment finding.”7 The Supreme 
Court remanded the case to EPA for additional proceedings.8 The 
Court did not say whether EPA must make an endangerment finding, 
and it did not articulate what policy concerns may be considered by 
EPA in making its finding.9 
 EPA must decide whether carbon dioxide and other GHGs are air 
pollutants that endanger public health or welfare. An affirmative find-
ing will produce intense pressure to regulate mobile sources as well as 
stationary sources. But, regulating CO2 emissions from motor vehicles, 
given the constraints imposed by section 202(a)(2) of the CAA, will be 
a challenge. 
I. Is the CAA an Effective Tool to Control Carbon Dioxide? 
 The first problem in using the CAA to control carbon dioxide is 
that, despite the Supreme Court majority’s position that carbon dioxide 
is within section 302(g)’s definition of pollution, carbon dioxide and 
                                                                                                                      
climate change technology activities,” but the Act did not actually establish any regulations 
on GHG emissions. Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1610, 119 Stat. 594, 1109–10 (2005). 
3 The petitioners probably would disagree, arguing the case involved statutory inter-
pretation of the CAA. See generally Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change and the Clean Air Act, 42 
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4 Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 530–31. 
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water vapor are the natural end products of combustion. Conventional 
air pollution control efforts usually seek to create ideal combustion 
conditions that are expressed as: HC + O2 + N2 → CO2 + H2O + N2 + 
heat.10 The process of forming carbon dioxide and water vapor from the 
combustion of hydrocarbons releases heat that produces steam to run 
electric power plants and the energy to propel motor vehicles.11 Without 
the production of carbon dioxide and water vapor from fossil fuel com-
bustion, there would be no useful energy produced. The modern world 
would come to a standstill. Because carbon dioxide is one of the end 
products of burning fossil fuels, the only ways to prevent the harmful 
effects of CO2 emissions are either not to use fossil fuels or to capture 
and sequester the CO2 before it is released to the atmosphere. 
 How may EPA control carbon dioxide within the traditional scope 
of the CAA? Conventional pollutants have been regulated by “com-
mand and control” measures since the Act was created. More recently, 
economic controls also have been utilized that usually involve an over-
all cap on emissions and an emissions trading system (cap-and-trade). If 
EPA is to regulate CO2, it will be difficult to develop a viable program 
using the CAA’s traditional command and control approach. For six 
common pollutants, called criteria pollutants, EPA sets national ambi-
ent air quality standards (NAAQS).12 Five of the six criteria pollutants 
are released or formed primarily from the combustion of fossil fuel. 
Each state creates its state implementation plan (SIP) to control emis-
sions from various sources in order to reach the ambient levels of pollu-
tion set out in the applicable NAAQS.13 This is supplemented by tech-
nology-based requirements imposed on various sources in order to 
reduce emissions.14 Section 126 of the CAA provides EPA additional 
authority to prevent major sources from releasing air pollution that 
may significantly contribute to levels of air pollution in excess of 
NAAQS in another state.15 Interstate air pollution transport also may be 
controlled by EPA using section 110(k)(5) of the CAA.16 A SIP revision 
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may be required if a plan does not adequately deal with air pollution 
being transported to a downwind state. 
 Carbon dioxide cannot be controlled effectively using the SIP 
process because atmospheric concentrations of CO2 essentially are the 
same everywhere in the world.17 Moreover, control based on the CAA is 
limited by the fact that the United States contributes only about twenty-
two percent of the world’s anthropogenic GHG releases.18 
 Under section 108(a) of the CAA, the Administrator shall list air 
pollutants “which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare.”19 After listing a pollutant the Administrator “shall 
publish” a proposed primary and secondary air-quality standard.20 Pri-
mary standards are to protect public health; secondary standards are to 
protect public welfare.21 No existing criteria pollutant has been desig-
nated solely for its impact on public welfare. It is not clear from the 
wording of section 109 of the CAA that the Administrator could prom-
ulgate a criteria pollutant standard for a pollutant that adversely af-
fected human welfare but did not adversely affect public health, and 
CO2 does not adversely affect human health at the concentrations 
found in the atmosphere.22 
 If EPA adopted a criteria pollutant approach to control CO2, it 
would have to set atmospheric numerical standards that were either 
above or below present values. If CO2 standards are set below present 
CO2 atmospheric concentration, the entire country would have a non-
attainment status with no realistic expectation that any measure taken 
as part of a SIP would lead to attainment of the standard.23 If a NAAQS 
value above the present CO2 atmospheric concentration was selected, 
the entire nation would be in attainment, and significant effort to re-
duce CO2 would not be needed. Compliance with the prevention of 
significant deterioration program (PSD) would be the major applicable 
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23 Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 
44,354, 44,367 ( July 30, 2008). 
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requirement.24 Sources could be forced to comply with the expensive 
and time-consuming new source review (NSR) process even if there is 
no effective technology to control carbon dioxide. Industry is con-
cerned that the 100/250 ton per year of any pollutant that is the 
threshold for triggering the PSD program under section 169(1) and 
the 100 ton per year or less threshold for nonattainment areas under 
section 302(j) and sections 181through 187 will result in the CAA’s 
NSR program applying to millions of carbon dioxide sources. 
 A gallon of gasoline when combusted combines with oxygen in the 
air to produce about twenty pounds of carbon dioxide.25 Therefore, the 
PSD threshold may be triggered by using about 10,000 gallons of fuel a 
year; in a nonattainment area it can take less combusted fuel to trigger 
the program’s applicability.26 Some people in industry would like to see 
EPA increase the 100-ton threshold, but it is not clear how the Agency 
could legally change a statutory requirement. Another approach would 
be to create a significant level test for CO2 that would remove most 
sources from the need to comply with NSR. Carbon monoxide (CO) 
has a significance level of 100 tons per year.27 However, to reduce the 
number of CO2 sources needing regulation to a manageable level 
would require the significance threshold to be set at a number ap-
proaching 1000 tons per year. Whether the courts would approve such 
a regulatory fix is unknown. If the existing 100/250 ton threshold for 
determining what is a major source is not modified for CO2 sources, the 
regulatory burden on permitting agencies will be overwhelming. 
 EPA could regulate CO2 based on the new source performance 
standard (NSPS) provision found in section 111 of the CAA, which has 
no emissions threshold.28 Therefore, almost all changes to existing fa-
cilities potentially could trigger NSPS applicability, although the ab-
sence of cost-effective control technology would hamper the use of this 
section. In addition, unlike other sections of the CAA, section 
111(b)(1)(A) requires an air pollutant to “significantly” contribute to 
endangerment of public health or welfare.29 It is not clear how much 
discretion the term “significantly” provides to EPA. Because section 
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111(b)(1)(B) requires EPA to review NSPS every eight years,30 environ-
mental advocates are expected to continue to pressure EPA to impose 
CO2 controls in any new NSPS regulations. The Agency promulgated a 
final NSPS for refineries on April 28, 2008, but the rule does not regu-
late CO2.31 EPA rejected consideration of GHG limits in a proposed 
NSPS for Portland cement facilities on May 30, 2008,32 and did not regu-
late GHGs in the NSPS for petroleum refineries that was published June 
24, 2008.33 The Agency is scheduled to propose other NSPSs. If EPA de-
cides not to regulate GHGs, litigation is likely.34 It also has been sug-
gested that EPA regulate CO2 emitted by existing sources using its sec-
tion 111(d) authority, but this would not appear to provide any relief 
from the problems already discussed. If EPA designates CO2 as either a 
criteria pollutant or a hazardous air pollutant (HAP) it cannot be regu-
lated under section 111(d).35 
 The CAA regulates HAPs that produce adverse health or environ-
mental effects by limiting emissions using technology-based require-
ments pursuant to section 112.36 Section 112(b)(1) lists 189 hazardous 
pollutants for potential regulation; CO2 is not on the list.37 EPA can add 
or subtract substances from section 112’s list.38 A substance is consid-
ered to be a hazardous pollutant if it creates serious health risks at low 
concentrations.39 But despite its universal presence, there are no 
known adverse health effects due to CO2 exposure at the concentration 
levels found in the atmosphere. 
 Section 112(b)(2) requires the health effects to come from “inhala-
tion or other routes of exposure” and then goes on to list effects such as 
carcinogenicity.40 These health effects are all the result of direct expo-
sure. Any health effects from climate change, whether or not caused by 
increases in atmospheric CO2 concentrations, are indirect effects, such 
                                                                                                                      
30 Id. § 7411(b)(1)(B). 
31 Proposed regulations were promulgated at 72 Fed. Reg. 27,177 (May 14, 2007). 
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as diseases spread by insect populations that increase at higher tempera-
tures. This differs from the direct harm caused by substances regulated 
pursuant to section 112. Furthermore, when section 112 discusses ad-
verse environmental effects as a basis for regulating a substance, the 
language “whether through ambient concentrations, bioaccumulation, 
deposition, or otherwise,” indicates a concern for the direct harmful 
effects of a substance.41 While EPA is given some flexibility in making 
decisions on the “frontiers of scientific knowledge,” case law requires a 
rational basis for a decision to designate a pollutant as hazardous.42 
There is not a rational basis for EPA to designate CO2 as hazardous. 
None of the section 112 toxic pollutants are as ubiquitous in the envi-
ronment as is CO2. It is unreasonable to assume Congress overlooked 
listing a pollutant emitted in the U.S. in the amount of 5061.6 million 
metric tons in 1990, when the CAA amendments were enacted.43 
 The HAP control program primarily regulates major stationary 
sources, which are defined as sources of emissions of ten tons per year 
of a HAP or twenty-five tons per year of multiple HAPs.44 If CO2 is des-
ignated a HAP, section 112’s requirements would be triggered by the 
emission of ten tons of CO2 per year.45 This threshold would be reached 
by burning about 1000 gallons of petroleum-based fuel and would 
make almost every home in America a hazardous emissions stationary 
source. Nearly every furnace in the country would require an operating 
permit. Administering such a program would be difficult and expensive 
with marginal benefits, but some people in industry consider the need 
for an operating permit to be less onerous than having to comply with 
NSR requirements. If section 112 is used to control CO2 emissions, pre-
sumably the technology standard of maximum available control tech-
nology (MACT) would need to be established.46 It will not be easy to 
accomplish this because no suitable control technology exists. 
 Another approach would be for EPA to claim CO2 is primarily an 
interstate transport problem and regulate it at the federal level. This 
would be similar to the approach used to regulate SO2 in subchapter 
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IV-A of the CAA.47 However, to comply with a CO2 reduction program 
would mean rationing the use of fossil fuel energy. 
 If EPA makes an endangerment finding for CO2 in response to the 
remand in Massachusetts v. EPA, it will have ramifications beyond the 
CAA, because other environmental laws have provisions similar to the 
language of the CAA. This could result in most environmental laws being 
required to regulate GHG emissions. A critical issue will be whether EPA 
limits any endangerment finding under the CAA to impacts on the envi-
ronment or extends an endangerment finding to include health ef-
fects.48 On June 26, 2008, the D.C. Circuit rejected a petition seeking 
mandamus to compel EPA to regulate GHG emissions from automo-
biles.49 In an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking published in the 
Federal Register on July 30, 2008, EPA effectively decided not to regulate 
GHG at that time and initiated a lengthy regulatory process, precluding 
a decision being made before the end of the Bush Administration.50 
A. Construction Permit Litigation 
 The CAA may not be an effective tool for regulating GHG emis-
sions, but that has not prevented opponents of new carbon emission 
sources from litigating to prevent construction of facilities that will re-
lease carbon dioxide in large quantities for the next half-century or 
more. The new source review (NSR) program requires major proposed 
new or modified sources to obtain a construction permit.51 The NSR 
process includes a determination of the appropriate pollution control 
to be used by an applicant. In areas that meet national ambient air 
quality standards, called prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) 
areas, section 165(a)(4) of the CAA requires the use of best available 
control technology (BACT),52 which, as defined in section 169(3), re-
quires the consideration of economic impacts and costs.53 In nonat-
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tainment areas, section 173(a)(2) requires technology to be used that 
meets the lowest achievable emission rate (LAER).54 To determine what 
qualifies as BACT/LAER, EPA usually uses a “top-down” analysis. The 
primary guidance is EPA’s 1990 New Source Review Workshop Man-
ual.55 This requires considering process changes, fuels, add-on controls 
and any other available methods to obtain the maximum degree of 
emission reduction,56 but there is no effective technology to control 
CO2 that meets BACT/LAER requirements. 
 The PSD process is applicable to “each pollutant subject to regula-
tion under this chapter emitted from, or which results from, such facil-
ity.”57 In nonattainment areas, the NSR process applies to any pollutant 
that is subject to a new source performance standard.58 NSPSs apply to 
any air pollutant as defined in section 302(g).59 This may provide per-
mitting authorities the discretion to impose more stringent require-
ments than otherwise would be imposed by the CAA. Moreover, states 
may impose more stringent standards pursuant to section 116.60 All 
states have been delegated the authority to run their nonattainment 
NSR programs; most states have been delegated the authority to run 
their PSD programs.61 
 An issue of concern is whether pollutants that are not regulated, 
but could be regulated, are subject to Federal PSD/NSR requirements. 
If emissions offsets may be imposed on any air pollutant as part of the 
PSD/NSR review process, may issues involving climate change be ad-
dressed?62 EPA has taken the position that CO2 is not yet regulated by 
the CAA, therefore, its impacts do not have to be considered as part of 
the NSR permit process.63 This resulted in EPA granting a PSD permit 
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60 § 116, 42 U.S.C. § 7416. 
61 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.165–51.166 (2008). 
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63 Air & Radiation Program, Region 8, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Response to 
Public Comments on Draft Air Pollution Control: Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration (PSD) Permit to Construct: Permit No. PSD-OU-0002-04.00, at 5–6 
(2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/region8/air/pdf/ResponseToComments.pdf. But 
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on August 30, 2007 to the Deseret Power Electric Company’s proposed 
new facility near Bonanza, Utah, despite its potential for increasing CO2 
emissions.64 The granting of the permit was appealed by the Sierra Cub 
to EPA's Environmental Appeals Board (EAB), which on November 13, 
2008 remanded the permit to EPA's Region 8 to reconsider whether to 
impose CO2 BACT limits and to develop an adequate record for its de-
cision. The Board found that the Region wrongly believed its discretion 
was limited by historical Agency interpretation. The EAB suggested the 
Region consider whether the public and the Agency would benefit 
from having the phrase “subject to regulation under the Act” deter-
mined as an interpretation of nationwide scope rather than through 
this specific permitting proceeding. 65 On June 2, 2008, the EAB re-
jected a challenge to a refinery expansion project for tar sands process-
ing in Illinois that did not include GHG controls.66 The case, however, 
was a win for environmentalists because the EAB remanded the permit 
to the state to review emission limitations for conventional pollutants.67 
 While EPA has resisted designating GHGs as subject to PSD/NSR, 
states deny construction permits based on climate change concerns. 
On October 18, 2007, the Kansas Department of Health and Environ-
ment denied an air permit for a proposed new coal-fired power plant 
saying it could consider the effect of unregulated pollutants if they pre-
sent a substantial endangerment to public health or the environment.68 
On March 21, 2008, the governor of Kansas vetoed a bill that would 
have allowed the construction of two coal-fired generation units by the 
Sunflower Electric Power Corporation.69 The bill was designed to over-
                                                                                                                      
see Steel Dynamics, Inc., 9 E.A.D. 165, 189 n.29 (2000); Genesee Power Station, 4 E.A.D. 
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64 Air & Radiation Program, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Final Air Pollution 
Control Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Permit to Construct: 
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65 Petition for Review and Request for Oral Argument at 1, In re Deseret Power Elec. 
Coop., PSD Appeal No. 07-03 (E.A.B. Oct. 1, 2007), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ 
oa/EAB_Web_Docket.nsf/Dockets/PSD+07-03 (follow hyperlink #1). 
66 ConocoPhillips Co., PSD Appeal No. 07-02, slip op. at 49–50 (E.A.B. June 2, 2008). 
67 Id. at 51; EAB Ruling May Bolster Activists’ Bid to Target Tar Sands Refining, 29 Inside 
EPA Weekly Rep. (Inside Wash. Publishers, Washington, D.C.) No. 23, ( June 12, 2008), 
available at FACTIVA, Doc. EPAW000020080605e4660000o. 
68 See Kan. Dep’t of Energy & Env’t, Responsiveness Summary: Sunflower Electric 
Power Corporation Holcomb Expansion: Air Quality Construction Permit Applica-
tion 9, 14 (2007), available at http://www.kdheks.gov/download/KDHE_Response_to_ 
Comments_10.17.07.pdf. 
69 Susanne Pagano, Governor Vetoes Legislation to Allow Expansion of Coal-Fired Power Plant, 
39 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 623 (Mar. 28, 2008). 
2009] Options for Federal CO2 Emission Controls 11 
turn the state environmental agency’s decision to deny a construction 
permit because of the facility’s carbon dioxide emissions.70 A legislative 
effort to override the governor’s veto failed.71 
  On February 26, 2007, environmentalists announced a nonbind-
ing agreement that eight of eleven proposed coal-fired power plants in 
Texas would not be built as part of a TXU Energy buyout.72 The com-
pany also agreed to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions to 1990 lev-
els and invest $400 million in energy efficiency.73 On March 19, 2007, a 
legally binding agreement between the Sierra Club and Kansas City 
Power and Light (KCPL) allowed a new 600-megawatt coal-fired elec-
tric power plant to be built in return for an agreement to offset its 
GHG emissions through energy efficiency measures and to build 400 
megawatts of wind-generated electric power by 2012.74 On February 28, 
2007, the North Carolina Utility Commission approved one of two 800-
megawatt facilities proposed by Duke Energy, but required the com-
pany to invest one percent of its revenues in energy efficiency and de-
mand-side programs.75 
 On April 30, 2008, the Iowa Utilities Board approved a construc-
tion permit for a predominately coal-fired power plant to be built by 
Interstate Power and Light Company.76 As part of the permit, five per-
cent of the plant’s electric generation is to be fueled by biomass within 
two years and ten percent of the power is to be fueled by biomass in five 
years.77 In addition, ten percent of the company’s electric generation in 
Iowa is to be from renewable sources by 2013, rising to twenty-five per-
cent by 2028.78 In this fast-changing regulatory environment, the ability 
to obtain a construction permit and the offsets that may be required is 
uncertain. 
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 For NSR permits, section 173(a)(5) of the CAA provides that a 
permit may be issued only if “an analysis of alternative sites, sizes, pro-
duction processes, and environmental control techniques” for the pro-
posed source demonstrates that the benefits significantly outweigh the 
environmental and social costs that are imposed by construction or 
modification.79 For a PSD permit, section 165(a)(2) requires considera-
tion of the “air quality impact of such source, alternatives thereto, con-
trol technology requirements, and other appropriate considerations.”80 
The extent to which alternative analysis can be used to require an al-
ternative be adopted is not clear, and this ambiguity can be expected to 
be used to challenge permit applications.81 
 Court decisions have held that BACT/LAER requirements cannot 
be used to force an applicant to redesign a proposed facility, for exam-
ple by forcing a proposed coal-burning plant to use alternative energy, 
gas or nuclear power.82 On August 24, 2006, EAB ruled that EPA could 
not require the use of low sulfur coal at Peabody Energy’s proposed 
Prairie State facility in Illinois because it would redefine the basic de-
sign of the facility, which was planned as a mine-mouth facility that 
would burn high-sulfur Illinois coal.83 Subsequently, in Sierra Club v. 
EPA, the Seventh Circuit ruled that EPA does not have to consider 
whether the applicant should use low-sulfur coal as a pollution control 
technology because such a requirement would require significant 
modifications of the plant.84 This case is considered an important 
precedent for the principle that BACT review cannot be used to re-
quire a redesign of a proposed facility. However, in Georgia, a state 
court in Friends of the Chattahoochee, Inc. v. Couch, on June 30, 2008, de-
cided an appeal from a state administrative law judge that awarded a 
                                                                                                                      
79 Clean Air Act § 173(a)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(5) (2000). 
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24, 2006). 
84 See Sierra Club, 499 F.3d at 655. 
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construction permit to a coal-fired power plant.85 The court remanded 
the case to the agency finding that CO2 emissions are subject to BACT 
requirements.86 Moreover, the 1977 amendments to the CAA require 
BACT analysis to consider innovative fuel combustion, and integrated 
gasification combined cycle (IGCC) is an innovative fuel combustion 
technique.87 On June 30, 2008, environmentalists challenged a pro-
posed power plant near Great Falls, Montana because of the failure of 
the state to require an analysis of BACT for carbon dioxide.88 
 The extent to which old plants can be forced to comply with cur-
rent standards remains an ongoing political and legal struggle. The 
PSD/NSR program applies to major facilities that are modified.89 On 
April 2, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court moved in the direction of sup-
porting EPA’s position when it ruled that, for new source review pur-
poses, an increase in emissions means an annual increase, not an 
hourly increase.90 Winning this case was important to those concerned 
with the effects of power plant emissions, but it was only one step in an 
effort to control old electric power plants. Environmentalists and states 
have started challenging operating permit renewals pursuant to sub-
chapter V of the CAA in an effort to force existing electric utilities to 
control emissions.91 Environmental organizations also are using the 
operating permit requirements to enforce the provisions of existing 
operating permits.92 However, they have had more success at prevent-
ing new facilities from being constructed than in controlling existing 
facilities. 
B. Mobile Source Control 
 The 1970 CAA Amendments created the mobile source program 
in use today.93 Exhaust emissions of hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, 
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and nitrogen oxides were to be reduced through the program found in 
section 202(b).94 From 1970 to 1990, the numerical values for emissions 
from light-duty vehicles (LDVs) and light-duty trucks (LDTs) became 
more stringent, and more mobile sources became subject to control, 
but this program to control mobile sources did not significantly 
change. EPA’s practice for the past thirty years has been to implement 
the pollutant-specific provisions of subchapter II, but it never regulated 
any other mobile source pollutant. 
 Heavy-duty vehicles (HDVs) manufactured after 1983 are subject 
to section 202(a)(3)(A) of the CAA, which regulates emissions of hy-
drocarbons, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, and particulate mat-
ter.95 Standards for HDVs under section 202 are to “reflect the greatest 
degree of emission reduction achievable through the application of 
technology which the Administrator determines will be available for the 
model year to which such standards apply, giving appropriate consid-
eration to cost, energy, and safety factors associated with the application 
of such technology.”96 Changes to heavy-duty truck standards are lim-
ited to standards promulgated under the CAA prior to the CAA 
Amendments of 1990, except for nitrogen oxides from model year 
1998 and thereafter heavy-duty trucks.97 Since GHGs, including CO2, 
were not regulated prior to 1990, the language of section 202 appears 
to preclude their regulation from heavy-duty vehicles. 
 Section 202(a)(1) of the CAA grants the Administrator of EPA the 
power to regulate “any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new mo-
tor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air 
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare,” but that power is restricted by section 202(a)(3)’s 
provision for heavy-duty trucks.98 Air pollutant is defined in section 
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302(g).99 Sections 202(a)(1) and (2) were added by the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1970.100 The clause “which in his judgment causes or 
contributes to, or is likely to cause or to contribute to, air pollution 
which endangers the public health or welfare;”101 found in the 1970 
Amendments was changed in 1977 to “which in his judgment cause, or 
contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to en-
danger public health or welfare.”102 The remainder of sections 202(a)(1) 
and (2) has not been changed since 1970. Because the “endangerment” 
language also appears in section 211(c) (regulating fuels and fuel addi-
tives), section 213 (regulating non-road engines), and in section 213 
(regulating aircraft), the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. 
EPA has the potential to affect most of the CAA’s subchapter II mobile 
source program. 
 Welfare is defined in section 302(h) to include effects on cli-
mate.103 If GHGs endanger health or welfare they can be regulated af-
ter giving vehicle manufacturers the time to develop and apply the req-
uisite technology and after giving appropriate consideration to costs.104 
Thus, it appears that for a GHG to be regulated, there must be findings 
that: (1) it is a pollutant; (2) it endangers public health or welfare; (3) 
there is an appropriate control technology; (4) the technology is cost 
effective; and (5) appropriate time is provided to apply the technology. 
While the Supreme Court has ruled that GHGs are air pollutants, the 
requirements imposed by the other four tests have not yet been the 
subject of EPA guidance. 
  The major problem in meeting section 202(a)(2)’s requirements 
is that there is no technology to control CO2 emissions. 
II. What Should Be Done? 
 For EPA to attempt to develop a response to climate change based 
on the CAA would be unwise. However, if Massachusetts v. EPA spurs 
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99 Clean Air Act § 302(g). 
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Congress to develop a rational climate change and energy policy, the 
Court’s decision will have achieved a desirable outcome. An appropri-
ate response to climate change requires balancing scientific uncertainty 
against costs, including mitigation costs, and the costs of delayed re-
sponse. Moreover, the costs of reducing both U.S. and global GHG 
emissions will depend on future population size, economic growth, 
technology development and use, and the mix and quantity of fossil 
fuels combusted. These factors may be influenced but are not subject 
to control by the United States. Moreover, costs and benefits of climate 
change mitigation are not incurred by the same people. Since CO2 
emissions will remain in the atmosphere for a century or more, present 
expenditures to control emissions will benefit generations not yet born. 
Because benefits occur in the future but costs will be incurred in the 
near term, a benefit/cost analysis will be extremely sensitive to the dis-
count rate selected.105 Put another way, utilizing traditional economic 
analysis, it is difficult to justify present expenditures that require a long 
time to achieve benefits.106 Furthermore, most knowledgeable people 
do not believe that global warming can be prevented, but if we act ap-
propriately we may be able to reduce some of its adverse consequences. 
 The costs of responding effectively to reduce GHG emissions will 
be high, but the costs of not responding could be even higher. The 
costs increase if a sudden, catastrophic, large-scale, irreversible change 
in the planet is considered a threat that requires an immediate re-
sponse, such as the shutdown of the oceanic heat conveyor or the col-
lapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet.107 Most of the cataclysmic disasters 
identified by scientists are predictions based on computer analysis. But 
when real world evidence is available, it may be too late to effectively 
respond.108 If uncertainties exist, who should bear the burden of proof, 
those who advocate business as usual or those who advocate GHG re-
ductions? A noted scholar has written “catastrophic risks deserve some 
kind of precautionary principle.”109 But efforts to avert catastrophic 
harm should not be used if they give rise to other risks of catastrophic 
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harm. “[E]ven for the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle, the 
cost matters.”110 This advice is worth pondering because climate change 
involves high risks and high response costs. 
 In the United States in 2005, 83.9% of the GHGs released from 
human sources were CO2, and 94.44% of the CO2 emissions were from 
fossil fuel combustion.111 A program to deal with climate change needs 
to focus on fossil fuel use and be tailored to the various sectors of the 
economy. Electric power plants, for example, depend heavily on coal 
for fuel. Coal combustion not only is responsible for CO2 emissions, but 
also produces conventional air pollutants that have adverse health and 
ecosystem effects. Nearly all motor vehicles are petroleum fueled. In 
2005, about forty-one percent of the CO2 from fossil fuel combustion 
was released from electric power plants and thirty-three percent came 
from the transportation sector.112 With these two sources accounting 
for seventy-four percent of the releases, they are the obvious targets for 
control efforts. 
 The first step to control CO2 emissions should be to create an ac-
curate emissions inventory that is publicly disclosed in a useful form 
such as facility specific, company wide, and source category aggregation 
of data. The Energy Policy Act of 1992, section 1605(b), requires the 
tracking of GHG emissions, but it has weak reporting standards, no 
verification, and no penalties for companies that do not report their 
data.113 This lack of accurate data makes it very difficult to have base-
line protection for companies that take steps to reduce their GHG 
emissions. The voluntary reporting program permits three different 
types of reporting: (1) “[p]roject-level reporting, defined as the report-
ing of the emission reductions or carbon sequestration achieved as a 
result of a specific action or group of actions”; (2) “[e]ntity-level report-
ing, defined as the reporting of emissions, emission reductions, and 
carbon sequestration for an entire organization, usually defined as a 
corporation”; and (3) “[c]ommitment reporting, defined as the report-
ing of pledges to take action to reduce emissions in the future.”114 At 
present, electric generators are the primary sources reporting CO2 
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emission data and their data is not readily available in a useful form.115 
The FY2008 omnibus spending bill enacted on December 26, 2007 re-
quires EPA to finalize an economy-wide GHG registry within eighteen 
months that is expected to be integrated into the CAA’s section 412 
reporting program.116 The bill instructed EPA to adopt the quality con-
trols mandated by the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) that 
is applicable to electric power plants in the Northeastern states.117 Con-
gress appropriated $3.5 million for EPA to develop and publish a rule 
for mandatory reporting of GHG emissions.118 It is unclear what will 
happen to DOE’s section 1605(b) registry. However, in the FY2009 
budget the Bush Administration eliminated funding for development 
of regulations by EPA for mandatory GHG emissions reporting.119 
 EPA, however, is moving forward. The Agency has developed an 
“Emissions & Generation Resource Integrated Database (eGRID)” that 
is a comprehensive inventory of environmental data on electric power 
systems that is based on information supplied to EPA, the Energy In-
formation Administration (EIA), and the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC). Emissions data is integrated with generation data 
from EIA to produce useful information for policy making.120 EPA’s 
responsibilities concerning GHG reporting were expanded by the Con-
solidated Appropriation Act of 2008, which requires implementation 
regulations to be promulgated by the Agency.121 
 To stabilize atmospheric concentrations of CO2 at even twice the 
pre-industrial level will be very difficult in the context of a growing 
world population and a growing demand for useable energy. To 
achieve stabilization will require that growth in primary power con-
sumption come from non-CO2-emitting sources. These include renew-
able sources (solar, wind, hydroelectric, biofuels), nuclear, geothermal, 
and fossil fuel combustion if it includes carbon capture and sequestra-
tion. A transition to a low-carbon economy could take half a century 
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and will be expensive. However, a low-carbon society may be healthier 
and more economically competitive. More than 2500 economists, in-
cluding eight Nobel Prize winners, have stated that “[GHG] emissions 
can be cut ‘without harming American living standards.’”122 No single 
technology will provide a “silver bullet” solution to global warming; a 
long-term strategy needs to evolve using many approaches. In the short-
term, however, energy conservation measures may provide the best op-
portunity for meaningful reductions in CO2 emissions. To develop al-
ternative energy sources and to encourage conservation requires that 
energy costs remain high or higher than they were in the summer of 
2008. If energy costs are allowed to drop, those who invest in a low-
carbon energy future may lose their investment, and attracting capital 
for a post-carbon economy will be difficult. 
A. Taxing Fossil Fuels 
 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) evaluated the pervasive 
uncertainty concerning both the risks from climate change and the un-
certainty concerning the costs and effectiveness of the three options for 
limiting climate change effects: “research and development, mitigation 
of [GHGs], and adaptation to a warmer climate.”123 It concluded the 
best policy is to select responses likely to minimize the costs of choosing 
an inappropriate level of control.124 The CBO advocates price controls 
rather than emission caps in order to control costs.125 If prices are set at 
a level close to the projected benefits of a measure, the risk to the 
economy is minimized. However, choosing the appropriate level of 
costs that should be incurred today to obtain benefits many years in the 
future is difficult. If standard economic evaluation approaches to dis-
counting are used, benefits that are obtained a hundred years from 
now have almost no present value. Benefits also are keenly influenced 
by the values assigned to ecosystem protection, which are not easy to 
quantify. Imposing caps on emissions is a questionable policy choice 
when there is no known threshold for significant damage; price-based 
controls are the better way to proceed. Prices can be increased over 
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time, if necessary, when better information concerning costs and bene-
fits is obtained.126 
 Various energy taxes have been proposed to discourage the use of 
fossil fuels, including taxes on gasoline, oil imports, carbon, or the en-
ergy content of a fuel (Btu tax).127 A carbon tax would tax fossil fuels 
based on their carbon content, which determines the amount of carbon 
dioxide that will be emitted when the fuel is burned.128 Not all fossil fu-
els produce the same quantity of CO2 per molecule of fuel combusted. 
The heat value comes from the formation of CO2 and water after break-
ing the hydrogen bonds of the fuel. Thus, the more hydrogen atoms for 
each carbon atom in a molecule of fuel, the greater the energy that can 
be extracted from the fuel per molecule of CO2 created. 
 Coal is a mixture of various chemicals. A typical coal molecule is 
C13H10O. Gasoline also is a mixture of hydrocarbons. Indoline is a 
common fuel and is expressed as C7H13. Natural gas is a mixture that 
may contain ethane (CH3CH3), propane (CH3 CH2 CH3), butane (CH3 
CH2 CH2 CH3) or other similar gases. The ratio of carbon to hydrogen 
bonds is about thirteen to ten for coal, seven to thirteen for gasoline, 
and two to five for butane. Because coal has fewer hydrogen atoms per 
carbon atom than oil or natural gas, it produces more carbon dioxide 
per Btu than the other fossil fuels. Because the carbon to hydrogen ra-
tio varies among fuels, a carbon tax should be imposed on natural gas, 
petroleum and coal in a ratio of approximately 0.6, 0.8 and 1 per Btu 
respectively. This means that a carbon tax would impact those who use 
coal far more than users of petroleum or natural gas. To produce a 
kilowatt hour of electricity results, on average, in emission of 0.57 lbs of 
carbon from coal, 0.54 lbs of carbon from petroleum, and 0.36 pounds 
of carbon from natural gas.129 The carbon from any fuel reacts with 
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oxygen in the air in a three to eight ratio by weight.130 Thus, for exam-
ple, burning a gallon of gasoline weighing 6.32 pounds will release 5.47 
pounds of carbon, which will combine with oxygen to create a little 
over twenty pounds of CO2. 
 In the United States we tax labor and savings, which are activities 
that we should seek to encourage. Taxes should be imposed on activi-
ties we wish to discourage, such as pollution and fossil energy use. The 
impact that carbon taxes would have on the national economy depends 
primarily on how the revenues from the tax are used, and what other 
taxes are affected. Taxes on GHGs could be developed that are revenue 
neutral. The best approach would be to return the money collected 
equally to every citizen. Those who purchased less than the average 
amount of energy would benefit financially. Ultimately, the economic 
and environmental benefits of a pollution tax are determined by how it 
is designed and implemented.131 An ideal tax would be set at the lowest 
amount that modifies behavior but that does not have an unacceptable 
adverse impact on those subject to the tax.132 This may not be possible 
to accomplish. 
 A carbon tax has advantages and disadvantages, but its advantages 
make this approach a useful policy choice.133 It would promote fuel ef-
ficiency, provide a wide variety of opportunities for energy conserva-
tion, and be “resilient and equitable” because its impacts would be dif-
fuse, thus easing the burdens on sensitive sectors of the economy such 
as the automobile and farming industries.134 A carbon tax would be less 
regressive than other energy taxes, such as a gasoline tax, because the 
“wealthy consume a greater share of electricity and ‘intermediate en-
ergy’ from manufactured goods than gasoline.”135 A tax on coal, petro-
leum and natural gas would be shared more equally and generate the 
same revenue as a much larger gasoline tax. The disadvantage of a car-
bon tax would be its disproportionate effect on the coal industry and 
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their customers because coal contains more carbon than other fossil 
fuels of equal heat values.136 Coal is produced domestically, and reduc-
ing its use would adversely impact the U.S. economy. 
 A gasoline tax imposes a direct tax on each gallon of this fuel. 
Such a tax could be used to reduce vehicle miles traveled (VMT) and 
raise revenue by making automobile travel more expensive. Each addi-
tional penny per gallon in taxes generates about one billion dollars per 
year in revenue.137 However, if VMT decreases, so will the revenue 
raised by a gasoline tax. A gasoline tax has several advantages. To the 
extent that VMT is reduced, carbon dioxide and other vehicle emis-
sions would be lowered. A gasoline tax would help reduce U.S. de-
pendency on foreign oil. It also would help compensate for costs that 
the price of energy currently does not reflect, including the costs asso-
ciated with pollution, congestion, and the national security costs neces-
sary to assure our petroleum supply.138 One estimate is that the direct 
costs of military protection for Middle Eastern petroleum supplies from 
1993 to 2003 was $49 billion a year, and this does not include the cost 
of two wars in Iraq.139 
 A gasoline tax has several disadvantages. It may be regressive and it 
may impact certain elements of the economy and regions of the country 
more than others. It has the potential to cripple sensitive industries like 
auto manufacturing, and it ignores other energy sources, such as coal, 
which contribute more CO2, as well as other pollutants, on a per-Btu 
basis. Moreover, because of the “relative price inelasticity” of gasoline 
demand, the size of the tax increase necessary to significantly reduce 
gasoline consumption may have a damaging effect on the economy.140 
 Gasoline or other liquid fuel taxes obviously would affect the pe-
troleum industry and transportation sector, especially the trucking and 
airline industries. Carbon taxes would impact all fossil-fuel energy 
sources but would affect the coal industry and its customers more than 
industries that use other fuels. Industries most affected by a broad en-
ergy-based tax include electric power generators, steel, petrochemical, 
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and some aluminum producers. Industry generally opposed energy 
taxes in the 1990s,141 but some members of the automobile industry 
advocated a gasoline tax as a substitute for regulatory controls based on 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards.142 For years, most 
people believed there was no realistic prospect that an energy tax could 
be enacted unless a catastrophic event occurred. But this view may be 
changing. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has come out in favor of 
transportation user fees and a carbon tax if the money is used to up-
grade roads, bridges, ports, airports, and the energy infrastructure.143 
The House Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman John Dingell 
(D-Mich.) proposed a carbon tax on September 27, 2007.144 
 Any government action, including fuel taxes, can be misused to 
reward a group with political power. For example, in 1993 Congress 
created a flexible-fuel credit that allows automobile manufacturers to 
receive credit toward the federal fuel economy requirements for pro-
ducing vehicles that run on ethanol.145 CAFE standards provide for 
flexible-fuel vehicles to have their fuel economy calculated as 1.74 times 
their actual fuel economy with a total maximum increase per manufac-
turer of 1.2 miles per gallon (mpg).146 “This adjustment is based on a 
legislative assumption that fifty percent of the fuel such vehicles use 
would, on average, be E85.”147 However, in reality, drivers use pure etha-
nol less than one percent of the time,148 and less than 0.2% of the gas 
stations in the U.S. sell ethanol.149 The manufacturers have used this 
provision to avoid $1.6 billion in federal penalties while selling vehicles 
that have poor fuel economy.150 As implemented by the federal gov-
ernment, vehicles only need to have the capability to run on ethanol; 
they do not actually have to use the fuel. The vehicle is credited with a 
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fictional gas mileage. The flexible-fuel credit was to expire in 2008, but 
it was extended until model year 2019 with a declining credit in the 
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007.151 As we move toward 
serious GHG regulation we can expect to see similar efforts by organ-
ized economic interests to direct large amounts of money from the 
public sector to their enrichment regardless of whether the environ-
ment of the nation benefits. 
 Even if a viable energy tax is enacted, it may not reduce petroleum 
consumption. Petroleum prices in the 1990s were about twenty dollars 
per barrel.152 The price dipped to a low of almost nine dollars per bar-
rel in 1999 and then rose to around thirty-two dollars per barrel in 
2000.153 Petroleum was $18.68 per barrel in January 2002, and it in-
creased to over $130 per barrel in the summer of 2008.154 Despite a 
600% increase in the cost of petroleum in six years, U.S. petroleum 
consumption increased at an annual average of 1.1% from 1997 to 
2007,155 but the high costs of petroleum-based fuel resulted in con-
sumption falling 3.6% in the year ending in mid-2008.156 
B. Cap-and-Trade 
 Market-based mechanisms usually focus either on limiting emis-
sions or limiting compliance costs. Tradable permits set emission limits 
using a cap. The costs then must be absorbed, and the trading mecha-
nism should be designed to allow these costs to be efficiently distrib-
uted. Tradable permits have predictable emission reductions, but un-
known costs. Emission taxes impose a predictable cost, but the 
marketplace determines the extent to which emissions are reduced. 
Tradable permits are a more rational approach for sulfur dioxide con-
trol, where costs and benefits can be more accurately estimated, than 
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for CO2 control, where costs and benefits often are unknown and are 
heavily influenced by modeling assumptions.157 
 It is unlikely that EPA legally could institute a tax-based program 
using its existing legal authority; it may need to use cap-and-trade if it 
seeks to reduce carbon emissions using an economic-based approach. 
However, cap-and-trade programs also are a suspect class since the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, on July 11, 2008, vacated EPA’s 
Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) that included a cap-and-trade pro-
gram for nitrogen oxides.158 If a cap-and-trade program for controlling 
carbon emissions could be promulgated that would withstand judicial 
scrutiny, presumably it would be similar to the program used to control 
sulfur dioxide under the CAA.159 This program is a closed system that 
imposes an emissions limit on a group of sources, primarily fossil-fueled 
electric power plants, and each source is allocated a portion of the 
overall emissions cap, called allowances, that it can use to cover its 
emissions or sell if it has excess allowances.160 
 A cap-and-trade program used to control CO2 emissions could be 
imposed on major emission sources or it could be imposed on fuels at 
the source of the supply. Alternatively, a nationwide cap on gasoline 
consumption could be imposed where individuals would be given the 
right to buy a specified amount of gasoline, which they could use or sell 
to anyone seeking to obtain more gasoline than they were authorized 
to purchase. This would be similar to the rationing of gasoline during 
World War II. In Europe, a cap-and-trade system is used and this ap-
proach appears to be the technique of choice for much of the world,161 
but it has been criticized as “ineffective, unwieldy, and prone to gaming 
and cheating.”162 According to Congressman John Dingell, the Euro-
pean market for CO2 emissions trading has fallen apart.163 Neverthe-
less, the European Union is committed to cap-and-trade. One impor-
tant change that is being proposed is a move toward having all 
allowances being auctioned by 2020 because of the windfall profits gar-
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nered by electric generators in the first phase of the Emissions Trading 
Scheme (ETS) from 2005 through 2007.164 Using the CAA to impose a 
cap-and-trade program probably would work for a limited number of 
major sources, but it would be impractical to try to include all CO2 sta-
tionary sources in a program. Because of the large number of mobile 
sources, to be manageable a cap aimed at motor vehicle emissions is 
most likely to be imposed at the refinery.165 A cap-and-trade program 
appears to be more politically acceptable than a revenue-neutral car-
bon tax, but it will have higher transaction costs, it will be more com-
plex, and it is unlikely to be revenue-neutral.166 It may lead to a massive 
transfer of wealth to the energy industries. This is a major problem with 
the legislation pending before the Congress. 
C. Legislative Proposals 
 In the 105th Congress (1997–1998), seven bills dealing with cli-
mate change were introduced,167 and in each succeeding Congress in-
terest in climate-change legislation intensified. In the 109th Congress 
(2005–2006), 106 bills, resolutions, and amendments were introduced 
that related to climate change.168 An important GHG bill has been the 
Climate Stewardship Act (a.k.a. the McCain-Lieberman bill). It was in-
troduced in January 2003 as S. 139 and provided for emission caps and 
tradable GHG allowances, but failed to pass.169 It was reintroduced on 
February 10, 2005, as S. 342.170 On May 26, 2005, Senators John 
McCain and Joseph Lieberman introduced a modified version of their 
climate change bill called the Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act 
(S. 1151).171 This third version of the bill continued to seek a reduction 
in CO2 emissions to 2000 levels by 2010 through a regulatory program 
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to be promulgated by EPA that would apply to GHG emissions from 
electric generators and to the transportation, industrial, and commer-
cial sectors.172 The major change in the bill was that it allowed revenues 
generated by the trading program to be used to develop alternative en-
ergy technologies including solar, nuclear, and IGCC technologies, en-
ergy efficiency improvements, alternative vehicles, and alternative fu-
els.173 On June 22, 2005, the Senate voted down the proposed 
legislation in a sixty to thirty-eight vote.174 The addition of potential 
funding for nuclear power may have helped defeat the bill because 
eleven Democrats voted against it.175 
 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 did not enact any provision directly 
regulating carbon emissions.176 It provides numerous incentives to en-
courage the development of nuclear and renewable energy, but pro-
vides substantially more money to expand the use of carbon-based fu-
els.177 These include the clean coal tax credit (section 1307), royalty 
incentives for natural gas production in the Gulf of Mexico (section 
1344), and the shortening of the recovery period for depreciation de-
ductions on natural gas distribution lines from twenty to fifteen years 
(section 1325).178 
 Numerous legislative proposals before the 110th Congress in 2007 
addressed some aspect of climate change.179 Some dealt comprehen-
sively with GHG issues while others were concerned with petroleum 
independence, terrorism, or were simply “pork” disguised as environ-
mental legislation.180 The most common proposal was to increase the 
corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards.181 Other bills 
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sought to establish a GHG tradable allowance system.182 Some bills 
would nationalize the California mobile source standards.183 Still an-
other approach is to limit automobile carbon dioxide emissions on a 
gram per mile basis.184 An important issue for Congress involves the 
choice of the agency to establish GHG emission standards for passenger 
vehicles. Some of the bills give the authority to EPA.185 Other bills give 
the authority to the Department of Transportation, which presently has 
the authority to administer motor vehicle fuel efficiency standards.186 
 The most important bill in 2008 was the Lieberman-Warner bill, S. 
3036, America’s Climate Security Act of 2008, which was introduced on 
May 20, 2008.187 It is a modified version of the McCain-Lieberman bill 
that was first introduced in 2003 and evolved into the Climate Security 
Act of 2007, S. 2191.188 S. 2191 was revised after it passed out of com-
mittee in December 2007 and was assigned a new bill number, S. 3036. 
The 2008 version of the bill has numerous changes from the 2007 ver-
sion, but the overall thrust of the legislation remains focused on cap-
ping GHG emissions and substantially reducing them between 2012 
and 2050.189 These emission reductions would be implemented using 
three separate cap-and-trade programs: the first covers most GHGs, the 
second covers hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HFCs), and the third covers 
emissions embodied in imported products. Section 4(5) establishes the 
basic regulatory unit for the Act’s program as one metric ton of carbon 
dioxide equivalent for GHGs. The bill’s section 4(7) defines the facili-
ties covered as those that use 5000 tons of coal a year; facilities in the 
natural gas sector; facilities that produce or import petroleum- or coal-
based fuel; facilities that produce or import chemicals that are GHGs in 
excess of 10,000 CO2 equivalent units; and facilities that emit as a by-
product of the production of HFCs more than 10,000 carbon dioxide 
equivalents of HFCs. The Act provides in sections 1103 and 1104 for 
affected facilities to comply with mandatory reporting and a verifica-
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tion process based on regulations to be issued by EPA to establish a 
federal GHG registry that would be published on the internet. A failure 
to comply with the Act’s requirements would subject the violator to its 
section 1106 civil penalty of up to $25,000 for each day’s violation. 
 Section 1201 creates an emission allowance account that begins in 
2012 with 5775 million metric ton allowances and diminishes over time 
to 1732 million allowances in 2050. There were 7201.9 million tons of 
CO2 equivalent emitted in 2006, therefore, it will take many years to 
achieve reductions that are considered to be needed sooner than the 
bill requires.190 Section 1203 provides that emissions without an offset-
ting allowance would be subject to a penalty of at least $200 per ton. 
Section 2601 would create a Carbon Market Efficiency Board to limit 
price spikes and act as a regulator of the carbon market. A Climate 
Change Credit Corporation would be established by section 4201 that 
will be a private corporation that will auction allowances allocated to it 
pursuant to section 3103 and distribute the rest based on regulations to 
be promulgated by EPA pursuant to sections 3201, 3301, and 3304. Dis-
tribution requirements are found in sections 3501 through 3504 for 
natural gas distribution and in sections 3902 and 3903 for electric 
power companies. The industrial sector and others would be guaran-
teed a portion of the allowances by sections 3904 through 3908. Sec-
tions 4301 through 4302 govern the auction process. Section 3101 pro-
vides for a deficit-reduction fund that will receive 6.10% of the 
allowances in 2012 and the percentage increases each year and peaks at 
15.99% in 2031, remaining at that level through 2050. These allow-
ances will be auctioned and the proceeds used for deficit reduction. 
While the proposed legislation provides for some allowances to be dis-
tributed through an auction, for many years most of the allowances will 
be given, without charge, to the major emitters of GHGs. Section 3103 
provides that only 21.5% of the allowances are to be sold at auction in 
2012 with increases each year until 2031 and thereafter when 69.5% of 
the allowances are to be auctioned. 
 Section 4402 encourages deployment of zero- or low-carbon tech-
nology. Incentives are provided for advanced coal technology develop-
ment, including carbon sequestration in section 4403. Incentives to 
produce fuel from cellulosic biomass are found in section 4404. Section 
4405 creates an incentive program for advanced-technology vehicles. 
Subtitle E provides for assistance to reduce energy costs for low-income 
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persons as well as for those in off-grid rural areas.191 Seven funds are to 
be created by section 4101 that will receive money from auctioning car-
bon dioxide allowances, including: The Energy Assistance Fund; The 
Climate Change Worker Training Fund; The Adaptation Fund; and 
The Climate Change and National Security Fund. Title V of the Act in-
cludes appliance efficiency standards that would modify the Energy 
Policy and Conservation Act at 42 U.S.C. § 6925(f) to create new boiler 
standards and modifications of 42 U.S.C. § 6297 to create new heating 
and cooling standards.192 It would require the Secretary of Energy to 
update building energy efficiency codes in 42 U.S.C. § 6833.193 Title VI 
encourages international efforts to reduce GHG emissions.194 
 Title VIII provides a framework for geological sequestration of 
carbon dioxide.195 The Act in section 8001 would amend the Safe 
Drinking Water Act to allow carbon dioxide to be injected under-
ground. Section 9003 provides for the retention of state authority to 
regulate GHGs if the regulations are no less stringent than applicable 
federal standards under the Act. 
 Free allowances that increase the price of energy would be a tre-
mendous windfall to the regulated industries.196 It would be far more 
equitable to auction allowances and return the money to consumers. 
Because the financial benefits from the carbon allowances are esti-
mated as having a value between $50 billion and $300 billion per year, 
there will be substantial competition by potential beneficiaries to finan-
cially benefit from the bill.197 The effect of most of the provisions in S. 
3036 would be to increase the cost of energy to all Americans and to 
distribute the money gathered by the government to the interests that 
successfully lobby for funds. 
 A competing bill is the Bingaman-Specter bill, the Low Carbon 
Economy Act of 2007, S. 1766, which in section 101 calls for a reduc-
tion from the year 2000 GHG emissions of one percent by 2025 and an 
eight percent reduction by 2050.198 However, reductions of sixty per-
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cent or more below 2006 levels are authorized by section 501 if the five 
largest trading partners of the United States reduce their emissions 
through comparable action.199 This bill would effectively cap the cost of 
allowances at twelve dollars per ton.200 Other competing bills are Sena-
tor Carper’s S. 1177 and Senator Diane Feinstein’s S. 317.201 They apply 
to the power sector while the Lieberman-Warner bill applies to most 
sources of carbon emissions. The Lieberman-Warner bill, S. 2191, was 
approved by the Public Works Committee on December 5, 2007, the 
first such bill to obtain approval, but it failed to pass the Senate in 
2008.202 It is expected to return as a priority legislative matter in the 
new Congress in 2009. 
 Legislative efforts in the Senate have received more attention than 
the House cap-and-trade bills, and efforts to enact the House versions 
must contend with the powerful House Energy and Commerce Com-
mittee Chairman, John Dingell.203 However, the Democratic leadership 
has worked to limit the influence of Representative Dingell. Represen-
tative Edward Markey (D-Mass.) is sponsoring H.R. 6186, and Repre-
sentatives Lloyd Doggett (D-Tex.), Christopher Van Hollen (D-Md.), 
and Earl Blumenauer (D-Ore.) introduced the Climate MATTERS Act 
on June 19, 2008.204 Both bills call for a 100% auction of emissions al-
lowances, but the Doggett bill would make the Treasury Department 
responsible for auctioning allowances, thereby bypassing the Energy 
and Commerce Committee.205 The Doggett bill is expected to become 
more important in 2009 because it is the Democratic leadership’s bill 
and is supported by about half the Democrats on the Ways and Means 
Committee.206 
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 If the Lieberman-Warner bill, or something similar, is enacted the 
big winner will be the nuclear industry, although the industry is not 
mentioned by name. The nuclear industry expects to tap into the 
money from the carbon dioxide auction proceeds that will fund the 
“zero- or low-carbon energy technologies program.” More important, 
however, is that an emissions cap and the cost of emission allowances 
will be an impediment to the expansion of the coal industry, which will 
benefit the nuclear industry.207 Geographically, the major loser will be 
the Southeast and Midwest states that are the most dependent on coal-
fired electricity and that have relatively high summer and winter de-
mand for cooling and heating.208 
 There should be a comprehensive federal program designed to re-
duce GHG emissions and Congress, not the Supreme Court, should des-
ignate the agency or agencies to implement the program. The mandate 
from the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA, while a poor way to deal 
with climate change, may turn out to be an appropriate stimulus for 
Congress to act. Congress now should move quickly to enact new climate 
change legislation that would give political legitimacy to federal efforts to 
control CO2. Such legislation should explicitly overrule Massachusetts v. 
EPA to provide structure and guidance to the EPA or some other gov-
ernment department concerning how Congress expects the new energy 
policy program to function. As part of this program, the cost of using 
carbon-based fuels must increase, but the increased costs should not be 
used to enrich the energy industry through free allowances or to create 
large semi-permanent subsidies for the energy industry. 
IV. Control of Fossil-Fueled Electric Power’s Carbon Emissions 
 Even if legislation is enacted to increase the cost of using fossil 
fuel, there will remain a need to regulate industries with high GHG 
emissions. Fossil fuel combustion in 2005 in the United States was re-
sponsible for about 94% of the CO2 emissions and 79.2% of the nation’s 
overall GHG emissions.209 Forty-one percent of the CO2 from fossil fuel 
combustion was emitted by electric power plants, which makes them 
the largest source of GHG emissions in the United States.210 There were 
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1336 electric-generating units in the United States in 2000 and 1032 of 
them were coal fired.211 In 2006, U.S. electric power production by fuel 
source was: 49% coal, 19% natural gas, 20% nuclear, 7% hydroelectric, 
1.6% oil, and 2.4% other renewable resources.212 Approximately one 
ton of CO2 is produced for each megawatt-hour of electricity generated 
from coal.213 But emissions can vary significantly depending on factors 
such as the age of the plants.214 In California in 2007, 358.55 pounds of 
CO2 were emitted per megawatt-hour; in Texas, 1278.71 pounds per 
megawatt-hour were emitted.215 CO2 emissions from electric power 
production in 2005 increased 31.5% since 1990, and in the same pe-
riod overall U.S. CO2 emissions increased 21.74%.216 In 2007, power 
plant CO2 emissions increased 2.9%, which is the largest one-year in-
crease since 1998.217 In government reports, the electric power indus-
try’s CO2 emissions are usually attributed on a pro-rated basis to the 
other end-use sectors: transportation (where it is negligible), industrial, 
commercial, and residential. 
 Getting rid of old coal-burning power plants would be the single 
move that could significantly reduce CO2 and criteria-pollutant emis-
sions. Replacing coal with modern natural gas plants would be the most 
practical immediate step if GHG emissions are to be reduced. Modern 
gas turbines are up to sixty percent efficient compared to thirty-three 
percent for coal-fired steam turbine plants,218 so CO2 emissions are 
lower, but natural gas availability and its high cost are problematic. 
Moreover, using natural gas for boiler fuel is not the best use for this 
valuable natural resource. A long-term goal should be to use renewable 
energy technologies to meet an increasing share of the nation’s electric 
power demand. 
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 Even if coal is replaced by cleaner technology, such as combined 
cycle natural gas generation, government intervention will be required 
to prevent old coal plants from being used to provide capacity reserve 
rather than being retired. More stringent air pollution control re-
quirements applicable to such plants could spur their retirement. Emis-
sion limitations based on power produced rather than fuel input would 
be an obvious step in the correct direction. EPA’s regulations usually 
provide for emissions based on heat input, not on the amount of elec-
tricity generated.219 This allows inefficient electric power producers to 
legally have emissions higher than energy-efficient plants.220 
 The role of coal in generating electricity in the United States is an 
important policy issue that has not yet been resolved. In early 2008 
there were twenty-four coal-fired plants under construction involving 
$23 billion of new capital investment.221 These facilities are expected to 
be far less polluting than older existing plants, but they could contrib-
ute massive amounts of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere for a half-
century or more. At the same time, pressure from environmental 
groups and state governments caused electric utilities to cancel or delay 
the construction of fifty-nine coal-fired power plants in 2007.222 The 
coal industry is lobbying hard to have the U.S. taxpayer dramatically 
increase the funding for clean-coal-related programs. If they are suc-
cessful in obtaining the funding, and the money expended results in 
technology advances, the continued dependence on coal-fired electric 
power plants would likely continue.223 However, the coal-fired electric 
power industry is not only facing expensive regulatory requirements 
related to climate change, but is also facing other increases in costs that 
threaten the economic viability of new coal-burning plants. The costs of 
these plants are two to three times the costs incurred in the 1970s even 
without CO2 control being mandated by EPA.224 Duke Power Carolinas 
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says their construction costs have nearly doubled since 2002.225 Many 
states are imposing reductions in GHGs as well as imposing renewable 
energy and energy efficiency requirements.226 Sequestering carbon 
emissions will be a costly process, although the costs and effectiveness 
of such measures are currently uncertain. More stringent controls on 
conventional air pollutants and the potential regulation of mercury 
emissions using MACT standards based on section 112 of the CAA will 
add to the costs and uncertainty.227 Moreover, the worldwide growth in 
electric power generation is creating competition for the resources and 
skills necessary to build plants, and that is leading to skyrocketing in-
creases in construction costs.228 
A. Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle Technology 
 For new coal-burning electric power plants, conventional technol-
ogy is to use pulverized coal boilers. The use of circulating fluidized 
bed (CFB) boilers results in less air pollution. Even better is the use of 
integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) technology, which is 
based on coal gasification. The coal gasification process can use high-
sulfur, low-quality coal or petroleum coke to produce coal gas (a.k.a. 
synthetic gas or syngas), which is then processed to remove pollutants. 
Coal of any quality is fed to a gasifier where it is partly oxidized by 
steam under pressure. By reducing the oxygen in the gasifier, the car-
bon in the fuel is converted to a gas that is eighty-five percent carbon 
monoxide and hydrogen. Sulfur can be removed as elemental sulfur or 
sulfuric acid and sold. Inorganic ash and metals drop out as slag, which 
is impervious to leaching and may be used in construction materials. 
When used to produce electricity in an IGCC facility, coal gas is com-
busted relatively cleanly in a gas turbine and the heat from the exhaust 
gas is used to run a separate steam turbine in order to increase the sys-
tem’s efficiency. This is known as a combined cycle. Conventional coal-
burning power plants combust fuel at about 3000 degrees Fahrenheit 
to produce process steam at temperatures that are usually below 400 
degrees Fahrenheit.229 Much of the heat energy of the fuel is wasted. 
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Cogeneration facilities use the excess heat to produce electricity, and 
can be twice as efficient as conventional power plants.230 
 IGCC, when used with stack gas pollution controls, provides the 
lowest emissions of criteria pollutants from coal-burning electric power 
plants and has a superior ability to cost-effectively reduce mercury and 
CO2 emissions. IGCC technology can reduce sulfur dioxide by ninety-
eight percent or more and nitrogen oxides by ninety percent,231 which 
exceeds New Source Performance Standards. New coal-burning facili-
ties require a heat input of about 10,500 Btu per kilowatt-hour of elec-
tricity produced, but the best IGCC generation facilities need only 4500 
Btu per kilowatt-hour.232 Because IGCC is more thermally efficient than 
a conventional pulverized coal plant, CO2 emissions are less per kilo-
watt-hour of production. IGCC technology may be a partial solution to 
the control of carbon dioxide emissions because it creates a separate 
gas stream of carbon dioxide that can be removed from the process 
and sequestered when the technology to accomplish this becomes 
available.233 
 In 2002, there were 160 commercial IGCC plants, built or planned, 
in twenty-eight countries.234 The United States has only two IGCC 
plants, the Polk County Florida 260 megawatt facility owned by the 
Tampa Electric Company, and the Wabash River Repowering Project 
owned by Cinergy. The Wabash River IGCC project cost, if applied to a 
green field project, was estimated at $1700 per kilowatt.235 The Tampa 
Electric Project cost $1213 per kilowatt.236 Project costs have dropped, 
but despite construction costs as low as $1000 per kilowatt and very ef-
fective emissions control, these plants have not been able to compete 
with low cost retrofits of existing plants that are subject to less stringent 
air pollution controls.237 Moreover, to get nitrogen oxide emissions to 
the level of natural gas-fired facilities requires the use of selective cata-
lytic reduction devices which significantly increase the costs of using 
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this technology.238 Tampa Electric was seeking to build another IGCC 
plant at the site of its first plant, but on October 4, 2007, the company 
announced it was scrapping its plan and giving up $133.5 million in 
federal tax credits because of the uncertainty concerning the require-
ments for carbon capture and sequestration and the associated costs.239 
On March 3, 2008, environmental groups sued the Department of En-
ergy to prevent the granting of $1 billion in tax credits for new power 
plants in nine states that are to employ “clean coal” technology, includ-
ing three IGCC facilities.240 
 Section 1307 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 provides a tax credit 
for IGCC projects in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).241 Section 48A 
of the IRC provides a twenty percent investment tax credit for qualify-
ing advanced coal projects using IGCC technology. On February 21, 
2006, the Internal Revenue Service issued Notice 2006-24 to establish 
the tax credit program.242 Section 48A defines a “qualified advanced 
coal project” as one that: (a) uses IGCC; (b) operates at forty percent 
efficiency; or (c) is a retrofitted or repowered unit that achieves an effi-
ciency of thity-five percent and meets specified design efficiency im-
provements.243 The project also is required to have ninety-nine percent 
sulfur dioxide removal and ninety percent mercury removal.244 
 If IGCC technology is to be used to make it easier to control CO2 
emissions, some assurance of an appropriate return on investment will 
be needed. There has been an effort to get the federal government to 
provide loan guarantees to encourage IGCC installation, but environ-
mental groups often oppose efforts to expand the use of coal.245 A site 
was to be selected in either Texas or Illinois for the construction of a 
275 megawatt prototype plant as part of the FutureGen initiative that 
would produce electricity and hydrogen while removing and sequester-
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ing carbon dioxide in a coal gasification process.246 However, after se-
lecting the Mattoon, Illinois site, the estimated cost increased about 
fifty percent, and in January 2008, DOE announced it planned to can-
cel the FutureGen program, and it did so on June 13, 2008.247 Some 
members of Congress are holding hearings, claiming that the Future-
Gen project was cancelled because an Illinois site, rather than the Texas 
site, was selected.248 However, industry continues to lobby Congress for 
funds to continue the project, but may build the facility without gov-
ernment funding assistance.249 
 In June 2007, EPA approved a construction permit to build a 630 
megawatt IGCC plant in Taylorville, Illinois, but the plant is not de-
signed to sequester carbon.250 If the plant becomes operational, it will 
be the first commercial scale IGCC plant in the United States.251 The 
Sierra Club subsequently challenged EPA’s position before the Envi-
ronmental Appeals Board in In re: Christian County Generation, LLC,252 
but the EAB denied review of the PSD permit on January 28, 2008.253 In 
Minnesota, Excelsior Energy is attempting to build an IGCC plant, al-
though it will not capture and sequester carbon dioxide emissions.254 It 
will be years before there can be large-scale commercial deployment of 
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sequestration technologies.255 For that reason, the Sierra Club and 
other environmental organizations are opposing the project.256 
 With about 154 new coal-fired plants proposed in forty-two states,257 
an important factor for IGCC technology acceptance is whether it is 
mandated as BACT or LAER in order to obtain a construction permit 
under section 173(a)(2) of the CAA in a PSD area or section 165(a)(4) 
in a nonattainment area. It has been argued that IGCC is BACT even 
though it is a different production process and is not an “end of stack” 
control. This position is supported by referring to the language of sec-
tion 169(3) of the CAA that includes different production processes, 
fuel cleaning, and innovative fuel combustion processes as BACT op-
tions.258 EPA’s 1990 draft guidance indicated that it was not the Agency’s 
general policy to redefine an applicant’s design for a facility for pur-
poses of considering what is the best available control technology.259 In 
the 2005 Energy Policy Act, Congress did not take a position as to 
whether IGCC was adequately demonstrated for purposes of section 111 
or whether it is achievable for the purposes of sections 169 or 171 of the 
CAA.260 EPA’s Stephen D. Page, in a letter of December 23, 2005, stated 
that IGCC is not BACT because it involves the basic design of a pro-
posed source.261 EPA’s position is that section 165(a)(2) requires alter-
native sources to be considered at an early stage in the permitting proc-
ess, but once a technology is selected, section 165(a)(4) requires 
appropriate air pollution controls to be considered.262 IGCC is consid-
ered by EPA to be a technology for generating electricity; it is not an air 
pollution control technology.263 On September 2, 2006, in a settlement 
agreement in Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, EPA stipulated that 
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the Page letter was not final Agency action; it creates no rights and does 
not have any legally binding effect.264 However, the 2008 decision by a 
Georgia state court, previously discussed, held that IGCC is an innova-
tive fuel combustion technology that must be considered.265 
B. Sequestration 
 Carbon sequestration may be accomplished through storage in a 
geologic depository or by using a biologic process in which carbon di-
oxide is removed from the atmosphere by plants that store carbon. A 
major benefit from effective sequestration is that America’s abundant 
supply of coal could be utilized without the adverse environmental im-
pacts associated with CO2 emissions. Risks from sequestration that have 
been identified include changes in soil chemistry that could harm the 
ecosystem, effects on water quality due to acidification, and the poten-
tial for large releases that could harm or suffocate people and animals. 
A report developed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) suggests that the risks of CO2 storage are equivalent to 
the risks from existing industrial activities.266 However, for geologic se-
questration (GS) to be effective it must prevent releases for centuries. 
We do not have much experience with injection on the scale that will 
be required for GS. GS will require dealing with the properties of flue 
gas from fossil-fuel combustion. That includes the relative buoyancy of 
CO2, its mobility within subsurface formations, the corrosive properties 
of the gases in water, the impact of the impurities in the flue gas, and 
the large volume of material that will need to be injected.267 The flue 
gas is expected to be compressed in order to convert it from gas to a 
supercritical fluid.268 It then will be transported to the injection site by 
pipeline; aided by the location of ninety-five percent of the largest sta-
tionary sources within fifty miles of a potential storage reservoir.269 The 
supercritical liquid will be injected, using proven technology, at a depth 
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of about 800 meters (2625 feet) in order to keep the CO2 in a liquid 
state.270 
 Carbon sequestration in underground reservoirs requires a permit 
issued under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA).271 The Energy In-
dependence and Security Act of 2007 gave EPA the explicit authority 
under the SDWA to regulate injection and geologic sequestration of 
carbon dioxide.272 Governors from oil and gas producing states did not 
want federal regulation of CO2 injection because they do not want in-
terference with the use of CO2 to force natural gas and petroleum to 
the surface.273 These operations are small compared to what would be 
required to sequester CO2 emissions from fossil-fueled electric power 
plants.274 EPA’s proposed rule governing underground injection of 
carbon dioxide under the Safe Drinking Water Act was released July 15, 
2008.275 
 The proposed rule creates a new class of injection well for GS 
wells, but it does not mandate the capture and sequestration of CO2.276 
It includes requirements to ensure wells are appropriately sited and are 
constructed to prevent fluid movement.277 There are monitoring and 
reporting requirements, including periodic re-evaluation of the under-
ground area to verify the material injected is moving as predicted.278 It 
includes testing requirements to ensure underground sources of drink-
ing water are protected, including post-injection monitoring.279 The 
rule also includes financial responsibility requirements to assure the 
resources are available for well plugging, site care, closure, and emer-
gency remedial response.280 The proposed rule does not resolve the 
uncertainty concerning whether carbon dioxide injected underground 
will be considered to be a hazardous substance under the Resource 
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Conservation & Recovery Act (RCRA)281 or the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or 
Superfund).282 EPA indicates that the concentration of impurities in 
the waste is expected to be low, but the Agency will not categorically 
determine whether CO2 injection is hazardous under RCRA or CER-
CLA.283 This means that those involved in sequestration could be sub-
ject to liability under these federal laws if there is contamination of un-
derground water.284 
 The proposed rule affects state regulation, but the role of the 
states cannot easily be preempted because many legal issues concerning 
sequestration will involve property, tort, and contract law that are con-
trolled by state law.285 An important issue is whether the surface owner 
or the mineral owner has the right to sequester CO2 and which prop-
erty interest has the associated liability.286 Wyoming became the first 
state to address this issue when on March 2, 2008, House Bill 89 was 
enacted.287 It provides that the pore space underneath the surface es-
tate is owned by the surface owner.288 However House Bill 90, which 
became law on the same day, allows the mineral interest owner to drill 
through sequestration sites.289 These laws help to answer some ques-
tions but do not remove uncertainties concerning liability.290 Moreover, 
it has not yet been resolved which federal agency will have oversight 
over long-term liability for sequestration or other aspects of the pro-
gram.291 
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 While the federal government has not been a leader in GHG regu-
lation, the Department of Energy has been active in promoting the de-
velopment of a framework and infrastructure needed to validate and 
deploy carbon sequestration technologies. It created seven Regional 
Carbon Sequestration Partnerships with more than 140 organizations 
in thirty-three states, three Indian nations, and two Canadian provinces 
as participants.292 Many profit and non-profit corporations are part of 
the various partnerships. The partnership program has two phases. 
Phase I is to develop partnerships, over about a two year period; iden-
tify potential carbon sources and projects; and evaluate infrastructure 
needs.293 Phase II will establish monitoring, mitigation, and verification 
protocols and begin to implement sequestration projects.294 Data from 
the partnerships characterizing sources and sinks are being integrated 
into the National Carbon Sequestration Database and Geographic In-
formation System (NATCARB).295 There also is a website for terrestrial 
sequestration demonstrations and for the environmental impact state-
ment evaluating the DOE sequestration program.296 
 The Department of Energy is providing $66.7 million for its seven-
year Regional Carbon Sequestration Partnership Program.297 To evalu-
ate carbon sequestration injection technology, DOE is funding a three-
year effort to inject one million tons of CO2 one mile beneath the 
earth’s surface in Illinois beginning in October 2009.298 An issue in mov-
ing such projects forward is the long-term liability of those participating. 
Texas and Illinois passed legislation providing protection through in-
demnification.299 
 At this time there is no commercial-scale demonstrated technology 
for use at electric generating plants that would capture and store carbon 
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dioxide.300 Moreover, carbon capture from most conventional power 
plants that use pulverized coal would require post-combustion capture 
using technologies such as chilled ammonia, which could increase the 
cost of electricity by fifty-nine percent.301 However, a report prepared at 
the University of Utah found the cost of carbon capture to be about 
forty dollars per ton and underground storage costs ten dollars per ton, 
which would add 7.5 cents to the cost of a kilowatt-hour or a seventeen 
percent incremental increase in the cost of generating electricity.302 EPA 
is backing the creation of a carbon capture fund, and DOE plans to 
support sequestration efforts “at multiple sites as an alternative to its 
canceled FutureGen demonstration facility.”303 The FY2009 budget re-
quest includes $156 million to support carbon capture and storage ef-
forts at several commercial scale electric power plants.304 
C. Nuclear Energy 
 Nuclear energy has no conventional air pollution emissions and 
no GHG emissions. While its use as a substitute for coal provides obvi-
ous environmental benefits,305 there are tradeoffs involving safety, ra-
dioactive waste disposal, and the centralization of energy generation 
(an issue not limited to nuclear power). Nuclear power facilities also 
present targets for terrorists, although the industry is a “harder” target 
than many other potential targets. 
  The United States generates nineteen percent of its electric power 
from 104 nuclear plants located in thirty-one states, mainly located in 
the eastern half of the U.S.306 Ten companies that operate seventy-six 
reactors dominate the nuclear electric power industry; Exelon is the 
largest with seventeen reactors.307 There have been no new nuclear 
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plants ordered in the United States since 1973. After the 1979 partial 
meltdown of Pennsylvania’s Three Mile Island plant the nuclear indus-
try was crippled. In the 1980s, Duke Power abandoned its partially built 
reactor in Cherokee County, S.C. at a loss of $2.7 billion.308 But the cli-
mate for the nuclear industry may be changing. In 2007, the Tennessee 
Valley Authority opened a reactor it closed in 1985.309 In late 2007, 
NRG filed an application to build two new plants in Alabama.310 Con-
stellation Energy Group is seeking a partial license to add a nuclear 
unit to its Calvert Cliffs, Maryland facility.311 As of January 2008, the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission had been notified that fifteen license 
applications would be submitted in 2008.312 Each application is ex-
pected to take forty-two months to process and will cost the applicant 
approximately $100 million.313 
 One of the reasons for the interest in nuclear plants is that the 
production cost of electricity is lower than natural gas, its primary rival 
energy. The nuclear industry’s average production cost for electricity in 
2007 was 1.68 cents per kwh.314 Moreover, most of the cost of waste dis-
posal and decommissioning of the plant is paid by the electric power 
consumer. But a nuclear power plant is expensive to build. A new nu-
clear reactor costs over $4 billion, and the cost of twin reactor facilities 
that most nuclear applicants will propose cost $12 to $18 billion.315 
Florida Power and Light claims its proposed twin advanced design reac-
tors near Miami could cost as much as $24 billion.316 An important 
element in revival of the nuclear energy industry is the amount of pub-
lic subsidies and loan guarantees Congress is willing to provide. Title VI 
of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, provides $1.6 billion for research and 
infrastructure and includes a number of provisions intended to jump-
start the construction of new nuclear power plants.317 Foremost among 
these are the approval of a production tax credit of 1.8 cents per kwh 
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for the first eight years of operation in section 1306 and the authoriza-
tion of the Department of Energy to provide loan guarantees of up to 
eighty percent of project cost for advanced nuclear energy facilities.318 
Section 638 provides standby support for delays beyond 180 days in the 
commencement of full operation for up to six new facilities due to liti-
gation or delayed Nuclear Regulatory Commission approval, and sec-
tion 602 extends liability protection for NRC licensees and DOE con-
tractors to 2025 through amendments to the Price-Anderson Act. 
 The Energy and Water Appropriations Act of 2008 extends the loan 
guarantee program to FY 2010 and provides $18.5 billion for nuclear 
reactors and $2 billion for uranium enrichment.319 In early 2008, it had 
not been resolved how the loan guarantee program was going to be fi-
nanced. Project applicants may have to pay fees to cover the risk of de-
fault on the loans that are federally guaranteed, but the industry would 
prefer the risk and costs to be placed on the taxpayer. It also is not clear 
whether the loan guarantee program is large enough to move the indus-
try to a new construction phase because of the high cost of construc-
tion.320 The FY2009 budget request would more than double funding 
for nuclear research and development from $259 million in FY2008 to 
$630 million in FY2009.321 This is more than ten times the budget for 
wind power development. The budget request also would extend the 
loan guarantee fund for nuclear projects through FY2011.322 A charac-
teristic of nuclear power is its long dependency on federal subsidies, 
which have amounted to $145 billion over the past fifty years.323 This is 
twenty-five times the support provided to develop wind and solar tech-
nologies.324 
 Another consideration are the limitations of the entire nuclear 
cycle. Uranium conversion is mainly carried out in a plant operated by 
CONVERDYN in Illinois.325 Uranium enrichment is primarily done at a 
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United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC)-operated plant in Pa-
ducah, Kentucky.326 Two new plants are being constructed, one at Pike-
ton, Ohio and another at Eunice, New Mexico. Both are targeted to 
begin operating in 2009. The uranium oxide (UO2) fuel assemblies are 
produced at four plants in Lynchburg, Virginia; Columbia, Maryland; 
Richland, Washington; and Wilmington, North Carolina. After the fuel 
is used in the reactor and removed it must be recycled and/or stored. 
Since 1977, there has been no recycling of spent nuclear fuel in the 
United States. Until recently, it was expected that spent fuel would be 
stored at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. However construction delays and 
political opposition have resulted in spent fuel being stored in fuel 
storage pools or in dry casks at reactor sites. Since 1998, the DOE has 
been responsible for storing this waste, with the costs covered by a tax 
on the production of electricity from nuclear plants. Yucca Mountain’s 
capacity is now too small to store the reactor waste produced to date. 
This led the Bush Administration, in February 2006, to propose re-
processing spent fuel in the United States, which in addition to produc-
ing new fuel would reduce waste volume and its radioactive life.327 
 In many European nations nuclear power is an important source of 
electricity. Five nations generate more than half their electricity from 
nuclear sources—France (78.1%), Lithuania (72.1%), Slovakia (55.2%), 
Belgium (55.1%), and Sweden (51.8%).328 Germany and Finland and 
the other Eastern European nations are heavily dependent on nuclear 
power, and the Eastern European nations are building a new generation 
of nuclear power plants.329 China has nine plants and may build up to 
thirty more by 2021.330 
D. Renewable Energy 
 Renewable energy sources such as wind, solar, biomass, landfill gas-
to-energy projects, geothermal, and hydro can reduce dependence on 
fossil fuels. The cost of generating electricity using renewable energy 
has dropped by eighty to ninety percent in the past twenty years and is 
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continuing to drop.331 Development of these “green” energy sources is 
a fast-growing segment of the energy industry, but the government has 
a mixed record in encouraging “green” power. The federal research 
and development budget for wind power is a modest $50 million in 
FY2008 and in FY2009 it is to increase to $53 million.332 
 Subchapter IV of the CAA provides 300,000 bonus allowances for 
utilities that implement renewable energy and conservation pro-
grams—as of November 2002, 47,493 allowances had been allocated.333 
Most were in the western United States, not in the South or Mid-West 
where most electric power plant pollution is produced.334 Yet wind 
power in 2005 could be generated at $.04 to $.05 per kwh and some 
facilities get close to $.03 per kwh.335 Replacing ten percent of 1993 lev-
els of electric power production with wind power could have been ac-
complished by developing 1.8% of the wind resources in the lower 
forty-eight states.336 
 An important development is the spread of state renewable portfo-
lio standards (RPS) that require a minimum percentage of the power 
sold in a state to come from renewable energy. Iowa, in 1991, was the 
first state to enact an RPS; it requires a specific amount of renewable 
electricity to be sold in the state.337 Most states that subsequently en-
acted RPS specified a percentage of electricity that had to be generated 
from renewable sources. The percentage of renewable electricity that is 
required to be sold ranges from 0.2 to 33%.338 By mid-2007, twenty-four 
states and the District of Columbia had RPS.339 New York, for example, 
requires twenty-five percent of the state’s power to be generated from 
renewable sources by 2013; California requires at least twenty percent 
by 2017.340 The major problem with RPS is they will not produce car-
bon reductions beyond those that could be achieved with a cap-and-
trade system. Moreover cap-and-trade will achieve the same objective as 
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RPS at a lower cost and will preserve the freedom of the regulated enti-
ties to decide for themselves how to best comply.341 
 The U.S. Department of Interior’s Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM) on June 21, 2005, published its programmatic environmental 
impact statement (EIS) that is part of BLM’s Wind Energy Develop-
ment Program.342 BLM hopes that in twenty years electricity generated 
using wind power on public lands will increase from 500 to 3200 mega-
watts of capacity.343 While the plan covers the western states, most of the 
development is expected to occur in Utah and in the three states— 
California, Nevada, and Wyoming.344 The BLM considers 160,000 acres 
of public land to be capable of wind-powered electric generation, based 
on both technical and economic suitability criteria.345 
 The federal government prior to 2005 provided tax incentives 
such as the 1.5 cents per kilowatt-hour production tax credit for wind, 
solar, closed-loop biomass, and geothermal projects.346 There also is a 
federal investment tax credit available.347 However, the tax incentives 
were not effective because they were unpredictable in their duration, 
while the industry’s financing typically is based on twenty-year power 
purchase agreements. The production tax credit was available only for 
facilities coming on line before January 1, 2006. The uncertainty and 
short duration of these federal incentives limited their value.348 
 The 1992 Energy Policy Act, established a 1.5 cent tax credit for 
every kilowatt hour of electricity produced using “qualified energy re-
sources,” a term that includes by definition only wind and closed-loop 
biomass, at a “qualified facility.”349 Closed-loop biomass is defined as 
“any organic material from a plant which is planted exclusively for pur-
poses of being used at a qualified facility to produce electricity.”350 This 
credit may be earned by a qualified facility, which is “any facility owned 
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by the taxpayer which is originally placed in service after” December 
31, 1992 for closed-loop biomass or after December 31, 1993 for 
wind.351 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 provided a two-year extension 
for certain facilities of the production tax credit and expanded the 
qualifying methods to include solar, landfill gas, trash combustion, and 
certain hydropower facilities in addition to wind and biomass.352 Vari-
ous tax credits for renewable energy have either expired or are near 
their termination date. Section 45 of the IRC provides a production tax 
credit for electricity produced from renewable energy.353 IRC section 48 
provides investment tax credits for commercial solar and fuel cell instal-
lation, and section 25D provides investment tax credits for residential 
solar and fuel cell installation.354 The tax benefits for renewable energy 
were to be extended by the bill that became the 2007 energy act. How-
ever, the bill’s renewable tax provisions were removed at the last minute 
because of opposition of the Bush Administration and the electric 
power industry. It also was opposed by the petroleum industry because 
Democrats wanted to fund the renewable program by removing $16 
billion in tax benefits from the oil and gas industry.355 The efforts to 
extend the investment tax credit for solar energy investment and the 
production tax credit for building wind turbines continued in 2008 as a 
small part of a tax bill, S. 3335.356 The bill is opposed by many interests 
because of its costs, and supported by those who stand to benefit, but 
renewable energy subsidies are trapped in the larger issue of tax legisla-
tion.357 
 Both wind power and solar power are intermittent power sources. 
Providing back-up power to intermittent sources is costly and limits 
their use. Therefore, to be economically viable these sources need to be 
able to sell surplus electricity to the power grid and to have the right to 
purchase power from the grid when needed. This is known as net me-
tering or net billing, and is encouraged by laws in many states.358 An-
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other potential solution is to use intermittent power to produce hydro-
gen from water, which is a form of energy storage. But this also adds to 
the cost of using these technologies. 
 Some of the costs of using alternative energy sources may be offset 
by siting the facilities near the source of demand. This reduces the 
need for long-distance transport of electricity and the accompanying 
stress on the power grid and also reduces the danger of disruption of 
the electricity supply from mistakes, natural forces, or terrorism. As the 
number of independent generating units grows, so does the overall re-
liability of the system. But, despite the environmental benefits of using 
renewable energy, coal-burning plants enjoy a significant cost advan-
tage. A centralized coal-burning electric power plant can produce elec-
tricity for about $0.045 per kwh, while distributed alternative energy, 
such as that from small wind turbines, can cost about $0.11/kwr.359 
V. Controlling the Transportation Sector 
 In 2006, the U.S. used twenty four percent of the world’s oil supply 
but it has only two percent of the world’s petroleum reserves.360 Trans-
portation is responsible for 68.3% of U.S. petroleum consumption.361 
The U.S. imports approximately fifty-nine percent of the country’s oil, 
with nearly one-fifth of the imports coming from the Persian Gulf 
states.362 Twenty-two percent of the world’s oil is controlled by states that 
are under U.S./U.N. sanctions for sponsoring terrorism.363 Venezuela 
does not support international terrorism, but its President, Hugo 
Chavez, is unfriendly to the U.S.364 With the United States importing 
about 4938 billion barrels of oil each year at prices in the summer of 
2008 that were in excess of $130 a barrel, producers are receiving about 
half a trillion dollars for petroleum. However, the U.S. Commerce De-
partment reported a trade deficit for 2007 of $815.6 billion, with only 
$293.5 billion being the petroleum deficit.365 Regardless of the apparent 
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discrepancy in these figures, our international relations and diplomacy 
options are dominated by the nation’s dependence on oil. This petro-
leum dependence requires tremendous public sector expenditures to 
support the military capability to protect our petroleum supply. The ex-
penditures for petroleum affect the value of the dollar and the overall 
economy, and the increasing worldwide demand is expected to keep 
upward pressure on oil prices despite the temporary drop in late 2008 
due to a worldwide recession. 
 If efforts to limit climate change are to obtain the support of a ma-
jority of American voters, GHG controls need to be justified based on 
issues of concern to voters, such as energy security, the trade deficit, and 
national security. Concern for biosphere protection is unlikely to moti-
vate either the national political leadership or the American public to 
modify their behavior, but other national economic and energy security 
concerns may do so. A program that involves the United States incur-
ring a substantial portion of the costs and receiving a disproportionately 
small share of the benefits is difficult to sell to American voters. 
 The transportation sector accounted for thirty-three percent of the 
U.S. CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion in 2005.366 Petroleum 
use is responsible for “virtually all” of the sector’s emissions—gasoline 
consumption for personal vehicle use accounted for over sixty percent 
and other activities, including diesel use, accounted for the rest.367 
From 1990 to 2005, CO2 emissions from the transportation sector in-
creased about twenty-nine percent for an average annual growth of 
1.9%.368 During the same time period, population in the U.S. grew at a 
rate of 1.1%.369 Thus, more than half of the growth in carbon dioxide 
emissions from the transportation sector may be attributable to the ef-
fects of population growth. 
 The U.S. Supreme Court sent a strong signal to EPA that it should 
regulate carbon dioxide from motor vehicles. This will be difficult 
unless subsequent judicial decisions interpret away the clear language 
of the CAA that limits EPA’s power to regulate motor vehicle GHG 
emissions. To effectively regulate CO2 would require the Agency to limit 
the amount of fuel consumed by the transportation sector. Its efforts 
will of necessity overlap and perhaps supplant law that presently regu-
lates motor vehicle fuel economy. 
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 Prompted by the 1973–1974 Arab oil embargo and the consequent 
tripling of petroleum prices, in 1975 Congress enacted the Energy Pol-
icy and Conservation Act (EPCA).370 Among its provisions were Corpo-
rate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards that impose fuel econ-
omy standards on light-duty vehicles.371 Since model year 1990 they 
have been set at 27.5 miles per gallon (mpg) for passenger cars and for 
light-duty trucks they were 20.7 mpg from MY1996 through MY2004.372 
CAFE standards for light trucks increased in stringency to 21.0 mpg in 
2005, 21.6 mpg in MY2006, and 22.2 mpg in MY2007, and the standard 
was changed in 2007 to require modest fuel efficiency improvements in 
MY2008 and thereafter in light-duty trucks.373 The 2007 changes are 
discussed below. 
 Passenger car fuel efficiency standards are set by Congress and are 
administered by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) within the Department of Transportation. NHTSA’s author-
ity is limited to adjusting the standards within a range of 26.0 to 27.5 
mpg.374 If NHTSA amends the standard above or below the mandated 
range, the amendment must be submitted to Congress, and either 
House has sixty days to veto the amendment, although this one-House 
veto may be unconstitutional.375 NHTSA may amend the CAFE stan-
dards for light-duty trucks after considering “technological feasibility, 
economic practicability, other vehicle standards, and the need to con-
serve energy.”376 However, from FY1996 to FY2001, Congress prohibited 
NHTSA from changing CAFE standards.377 
 EPA determines fuel economy using the Federal Test Procedure 
(FTP) that it uses to determine a vehicle’s emissions, but the test re-
ports higher gas mileage than is achieved in real world driving. The 
FTP numbers are lowered by EPA because these unadjusted values are 
about twenty-five percent higher than an adjusted “real world” compos-
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ite value (55/45 combined city/highway mileage).378 CAFE standards 
are based on vehicle tests at the end of each model year; EPA calculates 
the fuel economy performance for each manufacturer.379 If the com-
pany’s production fails to meet the standard, it is liable to the federal 
government for a civil penalty of five dollars for each 0.1 miles per gal-
lon the fleet is above the standard for each vehicle manufactured.380 
The CAFE program distinguishes between domestic and imported pas-
senger cars. An imported car is one with less than seventy-five percent 
domestic content. The domestic fleet and the imported fleet each must 
meet the 27.5 mpg standard. 
 The actual fuel economy of U.S. cars and light trucks was 22.0 mpg 
in MY1987.381 It dropped to its lowest value of 19.3 mpg in MY 2004 and 
then improved slightly to 20.2 mpg in MY2006 and 2007.382 Because of 
the increased sales of light trucks, vans, and sport utility vehicles 
(SUVs) the fuel efficiency of the motor vehicle fleet remained relatively 
constant for a decade despite improvements in vehicle technology.383 In 
1970, trucks made up 17.4% of the nation’s vehicle fleet,384 but in 2007, 
light-duty trucks and SUVs accounted for 49% of new vehicle sales.385 
In 2006, 44.35% of the U.S. vehicle fleet were trucks and SUVs.386 
 In 1978 Congress created a gas-guzzler tax to discourage the pur-
chase of passenger cars that get less than 22.5 mpg.387 This tax in-
creased in the 1990 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act.388 However, 
the failure to impose the tax on light-duty trucks exacerbated the ten-
dency of consumers to purchase trucks that actually are used as passen-
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ger vehicles. For a car that gets 12.5 mpg or less, the gas-guzzler tax is 
$7700.389 The tax drops as fuel economy improves and is not applicable 
to cars that meet a 22.5 mpg standard.390 EPA does not appear to have 
the power to modify this law. 
 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 contained no significant provision 
for improving the fuel economy of conventional vehicles, but it did au-
thorize $3.5 million per year to carry out fuel economy rulemakings.391 
It requires a report on the feasibility and effects of a significant reduc-
tion in fuel consumption by 2014, and it requires the estimated in-use 
fuel economy that is posted on the window of a new vehicle to be ad-
justed to approximate the mileage per gallon actually obtained by the 
vehicle.392 
 CAFE standards for automobiles are more stringent than the stan-
dards for light-duty trucks, SUVs, and crossover vehicles. A light-duty 
truck is “any truck or ‘truck derivative’ with a gross vehicle weight rat-
ing (GVWR) of 8500 pounds or less, and a vehicle curb weight (VCW) 
of 6000 pounds or less.”393 On April 6, 2006, the Department of Trans-
portation published a final rule mandating new fuel economy stan-
dards for sport-utility vehicles, pickup trucks, vans, and minivans be-
ginning with MY2008.394 The rule is expected to result in fuel economy 
for these vehicles of approximately twenty-four miles per gallon in 
MY2011.395 The new rule divides light-duty trucks into six classes ac-
cording to size, with each class required to meet a different fuel econ-
omy standard.396 President Bush asked Congress for statutory authority 
to develop passenger car standards using a similar classification system, 
but Congress did not enact legislation, so NHTSA must continue to use 
a straight-line average for passenger cars. 
 Manufacturers are required to follow the reformed CAFE system 
starting in 2011.397 During a transition period from MY2008 through 
2010, “manufacturers may comply with CAFE standards established un-
der the [new] structure (Reformed CAFE) or with standards established 
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in the traditional way (Unreformed CAFE).”398 The unreformed fuel 
economy limits will go from the MY2007 standard of 22.2 mpg to 22.5 
mpg in MY2008, 23.1 mpg in MY2009, and 23.5 mpg in MY2010.399 In 
MY2011, the reformed light truck CAFE standards impose a fuel econ-
omy standard of 21.79 to 30.42 mpg and apply to all manufacturers.400 
In addition, the final rule expands the applicability of CAFE standards. 
Starting in MY2011, the CAFE program will include medium-duty pas-
senger vehicles (MDPV) (i.e., larger passenger vans and SUVs with a 
gross vehicle weight rating of under 10,000 lbs), which is expected to 
bring an additional 240,000 vehicles into the CAFE program by 
MY2011.401 MDPVs have been subject to EPA’s “Tier 2” emission stan-
dards since MY2004. Pickup trucks and panel trucks are not subject to 
MDPV requirements. The final rule also contains language claiming 
that federal requirements relating to fuel economy preempts Califor-
nia’s mandate to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from motor vehi-
cles.402 
 The new light-duty truck CAFE standards have been criticized by 
environmental groups for not going nearly far enough in tightening 
fuel economy standards.403 However, the new system attempts to incor-
porate safety concerns into the standards by considering the product of 
a vehicle’s width (distance between tires) and its wheelbase (the dis-
tance from the front to the rear axles).404 The increased costs of the 
new CAFE average requirements are expected to be more than offset 
by fuel cost savings.405 
 In the Center for Biological Diversity v. National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, California, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jer-
sey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Minne-
sota, the District of Columbia, New York City, and four national envi-
ronmental organizations challenged the “Average Fuel Economy 
Standards for Light Trucks, Model Years 2008–2011,” promulgated by 
the NHTSA.406 Petitioners challenged the final rule under EPCA and 
                                                                                                                      
398 Id. 
399 Id. at 17,568. 
400 71 Fed. Reg. at 17,607 tbl.4. 
401 Id. at 17,570. 
402 See id. at 17,654. 
403 See Steven D. Cook, New CAFE Standards to Raise Fuel Efficiency for Light Trucks 2.4 
Miles a Gallon in 2011, [Mar.] Daily Env’t Rep. (BNA) No. 61, at A-1 (Mar. 30, 2006). 
404 71 Fed. Reg. at 17,568–69. 
405 See Yacobucci & Bamberger, supra note 140, at CRS-9. 
406 508 F.3d 508, 508, 513 (9th Cir. 2007). 
2009] Options for Federal CO2 Emission Controls 57 
 
 
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).407 Petitioners 
claimed the rule could lead to increased GHG emissions because the 
use of vehicle weight classifications may encourage manufacturers to 
build larger, less fuel-efficient vehicles.408 Petitioners also challenged 
the final rule as arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to EPCA because it 
does not meet the “maximum feasible” standard; it perpetuates the 
SUV loophole that allows light-duty trucks to satisfy lower fuel economy 
standards; and it excludes most vehicles between 8500 and 10,000 
pounds gross vehicle weight.409 
 On November 15, 2007, the Ninth Circuit held that the final rule 
is “arbitrary and capricious, contrary to the EPCA in its failure to mo-
netize the value of carbon emissions, failure to set a backstop, failure to 
close the SUV loophole, and failure to set fuel economy standards for 
all vehicles in the 8500 to 10,000 GVWR class.”410 The court also held 
that the Environmental Assessment was inadequate.411 The Ninth Cir-
cuit remanded the rule to NHTSA to promulgate new standards as ex-
peditiously as possible and to prepare a full Environmental Impact 
Statement.412 The case will have continuing significance because of the 
court’s comprehensive review of CAFE regulation under the 1975 
EPCA legislation. 
 While the challenges to NHTSA’s weak regulations were being liti-
gated, the ongoing efforts to enact legislation imposing more stringent 
CAFE standards for passenger vehicles succeeded when the Energy In-
dependence and Security Act of 2007 was signed into law on December 
19, 2007.413 Section 102 imposes more stringent CAFE standards be-
ginning with MY2011. Two sets of standards are imposed, one set for 
passenger vehicles and another set for non-passenger vehicles.414 The 
two categories are to achieve a combined fuel economy of thirty-five 
mpg for the fleet of vehicles sold in the United States by MY2020.415 For 
2021–2030, the fuel economy of each fleet of passenger and non-
passenger automobiles sold in the United States shall meet the maxi-
mum feasible average fuel economy as determined by regulations to be 
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issued by the Secretary of Transportation.416 In addition, each manu-
facturer shall meet a minimum standard for domestically manufactured 
passenger automobiles that is the greater of 27.5 mpg or “92 percent of 
the average fuel economy projected by the Secretary for the combined 
domestic and non-domestic passenger automobile fleets manufactured 
for sale in the United States by all manufacturers in the model year.”417 
How this legislation will affect EPA’s efforts to regulate mobile source 
GHGs is not clear. The Act, however, does not preempt EPA’s authority 
to set vehicle GHG emission standards, which will allow EPA to prom-
ulgate standards that either have the same effect as CAFE requirements 
or are more stringent. Creating two sets of overlapping fuel economy 
standards seems absurd, but such an action would be consistent with 
the Supreme Court’s holding. 
 Commercial medium-duty and heavy-duty highway vehicles as well 
as work trucks with a gross vehicle weight of 8500 to 10,000 pounds are 
to have new standards based on the maximum feasible improvement as 
determined by the Secretary.418 The regulations are to be promulgated 
within two years after a report—called for by section 108 of the Ten-in-
Ten Fuel Economy Act—is published by the National Academy of Sci-
ences.419 After regulations are promulgated they shall not be applicable 
for four full model years.420 Thus, the earliest that new regulations can 
be expected to be applicable will be in MY2016. The legislation enacted 
in 2007 includes a program that allows manufacturers that exceed the 
standards to obtain credits that can be applied to other vehicles in the 
manufacturer’s fleet that fail to meet the standard.421 The Act also in-
cludes new labeling requirements aimed at requiring more accurate 
fuel efficiency information as well as information on GHG emissions.422 
The Act will require new regulations to be promulgated that will be ap-
plicable in about four years. 
 The effectiveness of the 2007 legislation will not be manifested for 
many years and will depend on the discretionary actions of NHTSA. 
The discussion found in the Center for Biological Diversity demonstrates 
that NHTSA cannot be considered a strong supporter of environ-
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mental protection.423 Nevertheless, the U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion may be trying to act more responsibly. On April 22, 2008, its Secre-
tary, Mary Peters, announced a proposed rule that calls for a 4.5% in-
crease in fuel efficiency from MY2011 through MY2015, which exceeds 
the 3.3% increase in efficiency called for in the 2007 legislation.424 For 
passenger cars, the standard will be an industry average of 35.7 mpg by 
2015.425 Light-duty trucks must average 28.6 mpg by 2015, and the 
combined average must meet a 31.6 mpg standard.426 
 Only about twelve to twenty percent of the energy in fuel is used to 
propel the vehicle. Between 1976 and 1989 “roughly 70% percent of 
the improvement in fuel economy was the result of weight reduction, 
improvements in transmissions and aerodynamics, wider use of front-
wheel drive, and use of fuel-injection.”427 The potential for motor vehi-
cle fuel efficiency improvements by 2015 is only between 10 and 15%; a 
mid-range 12.5% improvement would produce about an 11% CO2 
emission reduction.428 Ultimately, using existing technology, GHG 
emissions could be reduced by about thirty-eight percent for cars and 
light-duty trucks and twenty-four percent for heavy-duty vehicles.429 A 
National Academy of Sciences study in 2001 concluded that it is possi-
ble to obtain a forty percent fuel efficiency improvement in light-duty 
trucks and SUVs at costs that could be recovered over the lifetime of 
ownership.430 A study by the Northeast States Center for a Clean Air 
Future concluded that a twenty-five percent reduction in carbon diox-
ide emissions could be made using existing technology.431 This poten-
tial improvement would not be realized if car buyers selected vehicles 
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with enhanced performance or if the improvement in fuel economy 
led to an increase in vehicle miles traveled (VMTs).432 
 The 2007 Act requires a forty percent increase in fuel economy 
from cars and light-duty trucks by 2020, but improved fuel efficiency is 
expected to be nullified by a projected fifty percent increase in VMTs 
by 2030.433 Population increases, as well as consumer choice, have con-
tributed to the doubling of VMTs since 1970.434 With VMTs averaging 
an increase of 1.9% per year from 1996 through 2006, it is very difficult 
to improve efficiency enough to overcome the effect on CO2 emissions 
from VMTs increases.435 The number of vehicles in the United States 
increased by over 55 million between 1990 and 2006.436 This is primar-
ily the result of the growing population because the number of vehicles 
per thousand people in the United States increased by about sixty-seven 
per thousand between 1990 and 2006, so about 12 million additional 
vehicles are attributable to increases in consumption, but 35 million 
additional vehicles appear to be attributable to increased population.437 
Sections 771 (automobiles), 751 (railroads), 752 (mobile emission re-
ductions), 753 and 758 (aviation), and 754 (diesels) of the Energy Pol-
icy Act of 2005 authorize research on vehicle fuel efficiency, and section 
721 establishes a program to promote domestic production and sale of 
hybrid and advanced diesel vehicles.438 The Energy Independence and 
Security Act of 2007 amended the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to include 
electric vehicles in the categories eligible for government assistance 
and created new incentives for electric vehicle development.439 But 
there appears to be no concern for the population growth that is driv-
ing much of the increase in VMTs. 
 To reduce CO2 emissions from the transportation sector will re-
quire both technology improvements and changes in the use of trans-
portation. To reduce VMTs requires long-term changes in land use and 
transportation that will be difficult to achieve because of the lack of po-
litical support. Moreover, many tax benefits are provided that encour-
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age a “petroleum-intensive lifestyle” including parking as an employee 
fringe benefit, “the home mortgage interest deduction,” “preferential 
tax treatment of the oil and gas industry,” and “rules that encourage 
the purchase of large sport utility vehicles.”440 Unless there is a major 
effort to reduce fuel consumption, GHG emissions will increase signifi-
cantly. For the period 1997 to 2007, U.S. petroleum consumption by 
the transportation sector increased by 1.5% per year, and VMTs per 
capita increased by 0.9% annually from 1996 to 2006.441 This resulted 
in a 2.11 million gallon per day increase in U.S. fuel consumption from 
1997 to 2007.442 
 Proponents of programs to reduce emissions of GHGs push for 
increased CAFE standards because it is believed to be more politically 
feasible than increasing gasoline taxes or imposing fees on fuel-
inefficient vehicles, although both economic-based measures and more 
stringent CAFE requirements could be used. If we are serious about 
reducing petroleum demand, we will need to increase the cost of driv-
ing by enacting a carbon tax or increasing gasoline taxes or by enacting 
other economic disincentives. According to the National Research 
Council, during the 1970s, CAFE standards reinforced the effect of 
high fuel prices and contributed to improved fuel economy.443 In the 
1990s—when gasoline prices declined—the CAFE standards helped 
keep fuel economy above the level to which it might have fallen.444 But 
CAFE requirements require many years to have a beneficial effect, and 
delay is increased by the need to provide manufacturers adequate time 
to meet the standard. Moreover, without high fuel costs, it is difficult to 
get consumers to buy fuel-efficient vehicles. There are at least twenty-six 
vehicles marketed in the United States that achieve thirty-four mpg or 
better, based on EPA’s highway fuel economy test.445 But not enough of 
these vehicles have been purchased to prevent motor vehicle CO2 emis-
sions from increasing. 
 The use of hybrid vehicles can lower fossil fuel consumption and 
sales would benefit from more generous tax benefits for those purchas-
ing these vehicles. The tax credit for buying a hybrid is as high as $3400 
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a vehicle, but the credit drops as a manufacturer sells more vehicles 
and terminates when a manufacturer sells 60,000 vehicles.446 Thus, the 
Toyota Prius, the most fuel-efficient vehicle marketed in large numbers, 
gets forty-six mpg and no tax subsidy. This makes the Prius less attrac-
tive to many potential buyers since its higher cost requires many years 
to be recouped from fuel savings. If the goal of Congress is to reduce 
the nation’s consumption of petroleum, it should not remove an incen-
tive because it works. Congress wastes billions of dollars subsidizing 
ethanol and dual-fuel vehicles, which have little beneficial effect on fuel 
consumption or the environment, but Congress limits the use of incen-
tives to purchase hybrids. While hybrids offer improved fuel economy, 
we should be planning to use plug-in hybrid vehicles that could be re-
charged at night when electric power demands are low.447 
 An important part of a GHG reduction program is an alternative 
fuels program to replace some of the gasoline and diesel fuel used in 
the transportation sector. Most of the effort to use alternative fuel has 
been directed at increasing the use of ethanol, which in the United 
States is almost always made from corn. Because ethanol is made from a 
renewable resource, it should produce no net CO2 increase to the at-
mosphere when combusted. However, because fossil fuel is used to 
produce the corn and convert it to ethanol there is little net energy 
gain, and the combustion of ethanol increases air pollution.448 The 
manufacture of ethanol also results in air pollution. On May 1, 2007, 
EPA promulgated regulations to allow ethanol fuel plants to avoid air 
pollution requirements imposed by the PSD and nonattainment pro-
grams and to avoid fugitive emissions requirements.449 Ethanol produc-
tion also has significant adverse impacts on water resources. Section 208 
of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 responds to part 
of this concern with language that gives EPA the power to consider wa-
ter pollution impacts when deciding whether to ban or restrict the use 
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of a fuel due to its water quality impacts.450 This is expected to help 
spur the development of cellulosic ethanol, which has a lower adverse 
environmental impact. 
 Without massive federal subsidies there would be no significant 
market for ethanol. Ethanol receives an excise tax credit and an in-
come tax deduction that is worth about $0.68 per gallon.451 If the re-
newable fuels goal of 7.5 billion gallons by 2012 is met, the cost to the 
taxpayer will be $5.1 billion a year.452 If the Energy Independence and 
Security Act of 2007’s 9 billion gallon requirement for 2008 is met, the 
costs will be higher. In addition, both the production of the corn feed-
stock and the construction of ethanol production facilities are subsi-
dized. Despite ethanol having no benefit, except political, that justifies 
the large subsidies given to mid-west corn farmers and ethanol produc-
ers, Congress in the 2007 Energy Act expanded the program to require 
36 billion gallons of renewable fuel to be used by 2022.453 The Act de-
fines renewable fuel as fuel produced from biomass and cellulosic 
ethanol. It also includes a low-carbon standard that requires refiners to 
achieve at least a 20% reduction in GHGs from new facilities, 50% for 
biomass facilities, and 60% for cellulosic facilities over their lifecycles.454 
On February 14, 2008, EPA announced the renewable fuel standard for 
2008 would require 7.76% renewable fuel, by volume, to be in gaso-
line.455 
 The use of ethanol for fuel has raised the price of food and threat-
ens the food supply of those nations that depend on U.S. food exports 
because farmland is being used to grow corn for ethanol production. 
In 2005 the United States used fifteen percent of the corn crop to sup-
plant less than two percent of gasoline consumed.456 In 2007, govern-
ment-created demand for ethanol was responsible for diverting twenty 
percent of the corn crop to ethanol refineries, which has contributed 
to the soaring price of corn.457 At the same time, we impose a fifty-four 
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cent per gallon tariff on Brazilian ethanol to keep it out of the coun-
try.458 The demand for ethanol for fuel also is leading to a worldwide 
conversion of land to the production of ethanol feedstock, and in the 
process forests are being destroyed to convert land to agricultural 
use.459 Congress, which appears to believe it should act first and then 
get the facts, authorized a study by the National Academy of Sciences to 
assess the impact of its renewable fuel requirements on the “production 
of feed grains, livestock, food, forest products, and energy,” in the En-
ergy Independence and Security Act of 2007.460 
 The CAA and other federal statutes encourage the use of alterna-
tive fuel. The Alternative Motor Fuels Act of 1988 requires the federal 
government to acquire as many light-duty alcohol and natural-gas-
powered vehicles as is practicable.461 It established the Interagency 
Commission on Alternative Motor Fuels and provides for a commercial 
demonstration program.462 The Energy Policy Act of 1992 applies to 
vehicles of 8500 pounds or less in fleets of twenty or more located in 
125 consolidated statistical areas, as compared with twenty-two urban 
regions under the CAA.463 Beginning in 1996, state entities and “alter-
native fuel providers” are subject to the Energy Policy Act of 1992.464 
The Department of Energy (DOE) may extend regulations to private 
and municipal fleets in 1999 if its program fails to generate sufficient 
voluntary efforts to procure alternative fuel vehicles.465 On March 14, 
1996, DOE issued a final rule requiring companies that produce alter-
nate fuels and operate light-duty vehicle fleets to acquire vehicles that 
run on alternative fuels.466 In addition to statutory requirements, ex-
ecutive orders establish alternative-fuels policy. For example, Executive 
Order 13149 seeks to reduce the federal government’s petroleum con-
sumption, and encourages the use of alternative fuel and hybrid vehi-
                                                                                                                      
458 See Will, supra note 456, at 64. 
459 See Michael Grunwald, The Clean Energy Scam, Time, April 7, 2008, at 40. 
460 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140 § 203, 121 
Stat. 1492, 1528. 
461 Alternative Motor Fuels Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-494, § 4, 102 Stat. 2441, 2442 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6374 (2000)). 
462 Id. at 2445 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6374(c)). 
463 Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 301, 106 Stat. 2776, 2867–68 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13211 (9) & (11) (2000)); see Clean Air Act § 246, 42 U.S.C. § 7586 
(2000). 
464 Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 501, 106 Stat. 2887 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 13251). 
465 See id. § 507, 106 Stat. at 2891–95 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13257). 
466 Alternative Fuel Transportation Program, 61 Fed. Reg. 10,622, 10,623 (Mar. 14, 
1996) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 490). 
2009] Options for Federal CO2 Emission Controls 65 
 
cles.467 The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 added re-
quirements for federal vehicles to improve fuel efficiency.468 
 For many years there has been a hope that a cost-effective tech-
nology would be developed that would allow the abundant supply of 
coal to be converted to a liquid fuel in a manner that did not create 
unacceptable environmental impacts. The process for conversion was 
advanced by the Germans during World War II and was improved by 
work in South Africa.469 The Air Force has been particularly interested 
in this technology because of its need for assured supplies of fuel for 
military operations.470 In the Energy Independence and Security Act of 
2007, Congress created a major barrier to using coal-to-liquid fuel or 
fuel derived from tar sands, both of which produce almost double the 
GHGs of conventional fuels based on a life cycle analysis. Section 526 of 
the Act bars federal agencies from procuring alternative fuels or syn-
thetic fuels unless a lifecycle analysis shows that GHGs are equal to or 
less than the GHG emissions from conventional petroleum.471 The Air 
Force seeks to expand its purchase of coal-based synthetic fuels and fuel 
derived from oil sands from Canada. It is not clear whether these fuels 
are alternative fuels under section 526, and Canada may litigate under 
international trade rules if its oil export trade is restricted.472 
 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 provides funding for states, local 
governments, school districts, and private cargo carriers to replace ex-
isting diesel engines and vehicles with alternative fuel, fuel cell, and 
advanced diesel technologies, or to retrofit emissions systems on exist-
ing engines (Clean School Bus Program, section 741 and Diesel Truck 
Retrofit and Fleet Modernization Program, section 742).473 It also pro-
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vides in section 802 for the promotion of the development of commer-
cial hydrogen and fuel cell technology.474 The Act in section 804 re-
quires the Secretary of the Department of Energy to develop a five-year 
plan, with milestones.475 The plan’s goal, found in section 805, is to de-
velop an infrastructure by 2020 that will produce a significant number 
of hydrogen fuel cell and other hydrogen-powered vehicles.476 The goal 
identified in section 811(a)(4) is to have 100,000 hydrogen-fueled vehi-
cles in the U.S. by 2010 and 2.5 million vehicles by 2020.477 The Act 
calls for programs that lead to the production of hydrogen from diverse 
sources including using renewable fuels, such as ethanol and methanol, 
and biofuels for hydrogen production. The Act’s Title VIII authorizes 
$3.3 billion for hydrogen fuel and fuel cell research and development 
during FY2006 to FY2010.478 However, the budget request for FY2009 
calls for funding for hydrogen fuel cell and other hydrogen projects to 
be cut from the $211 million in FY2008 to $146 million.479 As part of 
this program numerous demonstration programs are authorized at sec-
tion 808. Included in the Act’s directives are requirements to develop 
solar technologies to produce both electricity and hydrogen at section 
812.480 The Act calls for five projects to demonstrate the production of 
hydrogen at wind energy facilities at section 812(b).481 The Act author-
ized $1.25 billion over ten years for the development of a nuclear plant 
to produce electricity and hydrogen, and $100 million to demonstrate 
hydrogen production at existing nuclear power plants at sections 645 
and 634, respectively.482 
 The only way EPA can accomplish a reduction in carbon dioxide 
emissions from mobile sources is to impose fuel economy standards 
more stringent than the CAFE fuel economy standards administered by 
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the Department of Transportation or by imposing requirements limit-
ing the use of fossil fuels for transportation. Such actions would seem to 
be well beyond what Congress intended the CAA to regulate. However, 
in response to Massachusetts v. EPA, EPA and the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) are trying to coordinate their 
rulemaking efforts so that compliance with one rule will achieve com-
pliance with the requirements of both organizations.483 
VI. State Mobile Source Emission Controls 
 In 2002, California became the first state to impose GHG emission 
limits on motor vehicles when it enacted A.B. 1493.484 On September 24, 
2004, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) adopted GHG regula-
tions for passenger and light-duty vehicles. CARB’s regulations address 
carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and hydrofluorocarbons; the 
control level is based on each gas’s global warming potential expressed 
on a grams per mile (gpm) carbon dioxide equivalent basis.485 Compli-
ance requirements are based on the “fleet average” for: (1) passenger 
cars (PCs) and light-duty trucks (LDTs) under 3750 pounds; and (2) 
LDTs over 3750 pounds and medium duty passenger vehicles 
(MDPVs).486 CARB’s CO2 regulations commence with MY 2009 and re-
quire a reduction in CO2 emissions of about twenty-eight percent for 
cars and LDTs and eighteen percent for larger trucks and sport utility 
vehicles before 2013.487 The second phase, targeted for 2013 to 2016, 
requires a thirty-six percent reduction for cars and LDTs and twenty-
four percent for larger vehicles from 2009 levels.488 Manufacturers that 
meet or exceed the requirements receive credits that may be used to 
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offset a manufacturer’s emissions for up to five years.489 The law was 
challenged by automobile dealers and by the Alliance of Automobile 
Manufacturers.490 They claimed the CAA and the Energy Policy and 
Conservation Act (EPCA) preempt California’s law.491 In February 2005, 
the Association of International Automobile Manufacturers (AIAM) 
joined the lawsuit.492 
 On December 21, 2005, CARB requested a waiver from EPA pur-
suant to section 209(b) of the CAA in order for the state to regulate 
GHGs.493 An issue that needed to be resolved was whether EPCA pre-
empts the field of fuel economy regulations pursuant to the Supremacy 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.494 In Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. 
Witherspoon, the court, in motions for judgment on the pleadings, ad-
dressed the preemption issues.495 The court held that neither the CAA’s 
section 209, EPCA, nor any other statute before the court allows Cali-
fornia to disrupt the CAFE program, but this is not any issue to be de-
cided on the pleadings.496 The regulations, the court held, are pre-
empted under section 209(a) unless EPA grants a section 209(b) waiver 
because they are emission standards.497 The court went on to deny that 
EPCA creates a Dormant Commerce Clause issue because Congress, in 
enacting section 209, made a decision that more stringent California 
emission standards were a justified burden on commerce, although the 
court did not rule on whether EPCA preempts California’s regula-
tions.498 After this procedural skirmish, the court placed the case on 
hold until the Supreme Court could decide Massachusetts v. EPA.499 
 Meanwhile, EPA was not acting on California’s waiver request to 
allow the state to set mobile source CO2 emission standards. EPA was 
concerned that it might not have authority to issue a waiver because 
such standards are actually fuel economy standards regulated by DOT, 
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but it said that it would wait until the Supreme Court decided Massa-
chusetts v. EPA before making a decision. After the Supreme Court de-
cided the case on April 2, 2007 and approved the use of overlapping 
fuel economy standards by both EPA and DOT, the pressure on EPA to 
issue a waiver to California increased. Pursuant to section 177 of the 
CAA, states with nonattainment areas may adopt California’s new mo-
tor vehicle emission standards.500 Nine northeastern states (Connecti-
cut, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, and Vermont), as well as Arizona, Florida, New 
Mexico, Oregon, and Washington adopted California’s standards. In 
addition, states, including California, are seeking to have the federal 
government impose GHG emission restrictions on nonroad engines, 
which were claimed to be the source of 220 million tons of GHG emis-
sions in 2007.501 Their standards, however, are not enforceable until 
California receives a waiver from EPA allowing the standards to be im-
plemented. Automobile dealers and manufacturers were litigating in 
California in the Witherspoon case to prevent imposition of fuel econ-
omy standards more stringent than federal requirements. In Vermont 
and Rhode Island, the automobile industry sued to prevent GHG regu-
lations based on section 177 of the CAA from being implemented.502 
 Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie was decided 
on September 12, 2007.503 The court, in a long opinion, ruled on Ver-
mont’s effort to regulate GHG emissions, although the regulation can-
not be implemented until California receives a waiver for its regulations 
from EPA.504 The court concluded that the case was not about federal 
preemption under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), as 
plaintiffs claimed.505 The case was about the potential conflict between 
the EPCA and the CAA.506 The court held that the EPCA does not ex-
pressly preempt Vermont’s GHG regulations, nor are they preempted 
under the doctrine of field preemption or conflict preemption.507 The 
court held that Vermont’s rules that limit the grams per mile of carbon 
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dioxide equivalent that may be emitted are not fuel economy standards 
but are emission standards.508 The court held “the fact that manufac-
turers may have to increase fuel economy . . . to comply does not per se 
convert an emissions standard to a fuel economy standard.”509 The 
court suggests that new technologies can be used to reduce GHG emis-
sions, which supports its position that emission standards are not fuel 
economy standards.510 The court’s position that regulatory limits on 
carbon dioxide equivalents in grams per mile is not a fuel economy 
standard is not supported by the laws of chemistry, but it is consistent 
with the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA, which also 
twisted the applicable science to obtain the desired holding. 
 On December 19, 2007, EPA denied California’s request for a 
waiver, and on February 29, 2008, the denial was submitted for publica-
tion in the Federal Register.511 This denial also prevents the fourteen 
other states that have adopted California’s GHG regulations from im-
plementing their programs.512 This is the first time that a request by 
California for a waiver has been denied; fifty-three waivers previously 
had been granted.513 In response to EPA’s action, Representative Henry 
Waxman (D-Ca.) opened an investigation, and other members of Con-
gress were demanding investigations.514 On January 2, 2008, California 
and fifteen other states filed a lawsuit in the Ninth Circuit seeking to 
overturn EPA’s decision.515 The Congressional Research Service issued a 
report on December 27, 2007 analyzing the legal requirements for 
granting or denying a waiver.516 Four tests are identified: (1) whether 
the state has determined that its standards will be, in the aggregate, “at 
least as protective of public health and welfare as applicable federal 
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standards”; (2) whether this determination was “arbitrary and capri-
cious”; (3) “whether the state needs such standards to meet compelling 
and extraordinary conditions”; and (4) “whether the standards and ac-
companying enforcement procedures are consistent with section 202(a) 
of the Clean Air Act.”517 The tenor of the report supports California’s 
position that EPA acted illegally. 
  EPA’s Administrator Stephen Johnson said that the Energy Inde-
pendence and Security Act of 2007 would address global warming bet-
ter than a “patchwork” of standards.518 This appears to be an erroneous 
statement. A California Air Resources Board (CARB) study documents 
that its GHG rules require more than double the reduction of the fed-
eral rules.519 If the states that already have adopted the California stan-
dards are included in an evaluation, the CO2 reduction between 2008 
and 2016 would be 145 million metric tons (MMT) compared to 66 
MMT from the federal standard.520 California’s rule would equate to a 
forty-three mpg CAFE standard by 2020 compared to a federal CAFE 
standard of thirty-five mpg by 2020.521 
Conclusion 
 Environmental degradation usually results from combined effects 
of population, per capita consumption and the amount of pollution 
per unit of consumption.522 However, there is little, if any, widespread 
support for controlling either population or consumption. Because 
CO2 emissions are produced even during ideal combustion, there is 
little hope of controlling carbon emissions through traditional pollu-
tion control efforts. To reduce CO2 emissions requires increasing the 
thermal efficiency of production, substituting nuclear or renewable 
energy for fossil fuel, and sequestering CO2. But utilizing these ap-
proaches will be costly and will require the use of technology that is not 
yet commercially available. Thus, worldwide emissions of carbon diox-
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ide are expected to grow fifty percent from 2005 to 2030 according to 
the U.S. Energy Information Administration.523 
 The climate change debate pits the developed world, which has 
been responsible for most of the increase in CO2 levels, against the de-
veloping world, which is expected to contribute to most of the increase 
in the future.524 Moreover, much of the increase is driven by the de-
mands of an expanding population. World carbon dioxide emissions 
have increased 500% as the population increased 264% since 1950.525 
This would indicate that the growth in population is responsible for a 
significant portion of the increase in carbon dioxide emissions and the 
remainder of the increase is due to an increased standard of living, as-
suming a rough correlation between energy consumption and the 
standard of living. However, restrictions on energy use could have dev-
astating effects on efforts to improve the standard of living in poor na-
tions because the increase in population and the increase in energy 
consumption in the past half century have not necessarily occurred in 
the same countries. 
 If humans are the cause of global warming, the rational approach 
would be to focus on the increase in population and consumption, but 
these factors are usually not addressed because of the lack of any politi-
cal consensus in the United States or with most of the international 
community. It may be fair to say that the probability of successful efforts 
to control world population growth is slim, and the odds of nations 
abandoning efforts to improve their standards of living are lower. By 
2015, thirteen cities are expected to have populations exceeding 10 
million. Dhaka, Bangladesh, for example, located in a region expected 
to have serious problems from climate change, is projected to grow 
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from 10 million people in 2000 to 22.8 million by 2015.526 The effect of 
climate change on these unstable and unsustainable areas of the world 
will have serious repercussions for national security.527 
 The United States is the world’s third-largest nation, after China 
and India, with a population of over 300 million people.528 The primary 
contributor to GHG emissions from U.S. sources is carbon dioxide cre-
ated by our large population directly and indirectly utilizing fossil fu-
els.529 Carbon dioxide emissions in the U.S. from fossil fuel combustion 
have increased annually since 1990 by an average of 1.4%; more recently 
the rate of increase has been less—0.7% in 2004.530 The nation’s CO2 
emissions increase at about the same rate as the population increase of 
about 0.97% annually, which is among the highest rates of population 
increase of any developed nation.531 In the span of thirty-nine years, 
from 1967 to 2006, the U.S. population rose by 100 million.532 More 
than three million people are added to the U.S. population each year.533 
If present trends in birthrate and immigration continue, the country is 
projected to have another 100 million people by 2043.534 
 To stabilize domestic carbon dioxide emissions, each American will 
have to reduce their fossil-fuel energy consumption by about one per-
cent annually to overcome the emissions that appear to be attributable 
to the annual U.S. population increase. To reach the 1990 emission 
levels, which is the target of the Kyoto Protocol, would require addi-
tional reductions to offset the effects of the production necessary to 
sustain the more than fifty-seven million people added to the popula-
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tion since 1990.535 The required reduction creates problems not shared 
by most developed nations because they do not have the same generous 
acceptance of legal and illegal immigration. Stabilizing our population 
would make the control of GHG emissions easier for the United States 
to achieve. But, in EPA’s publication, U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and 
Sinks 1990–2005, the Agency’s discussion of the factors contributing to 
climate change in its executive summary makes no mention of popula-
tion growth as a factor in the U.S. carbon dioxide emissions. 
 Because population stabilization appears to be an issue that is “off-
the-table,” use of fossil fuels needs to be reduced at a rate that exceeds 
the effect of an expanding population. The most important stationary 
source of CO2 emissions is the electric power industry. Cleaner and 
more efficient coal-burning plants could be built if we are willing to pay 
for them, but for thirty-six years the CAA and the political process has 
protected the electric utility from being required to upgrade many of 
its facilities. However, while new facilities can be designed to produce 
significantly less conventional pollution, fossil-fuel plants at this time 
can reduce carbon emissions by only about fifteen percent because 
carbon dioxide emissions are a function of energy conversion effi-
ciency, not pollution controls. Moreover, with a dozen new coal-
burning plants under construction and up to 150 new plants being pro-
jected by the Department of Energy to be constructed by 2030, the 
probability of significant CO2 reductions are small, although the move 
to prevent the construction of new coal-burning power plants, previ-
ously discussed, may limit the number of plants actually constructed.536 
 An alternative approach would be to utilize more non-fossil-fueled 
electric power generation. Nuclear energy is an obvious choice, but its 
use presents issues of capital costs, subsidies, safety, and radioactive 
waste disposal.537 New hydroelectric plants are almost impossible to 
build because of opposition from environmentalists. Wind power often 
is opposed by environmentalists and by citizens living near proposed 
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facilities.538 Moreover, wind power usually is not capable of being used 
for base load power. This could change if wind power generation was 
spread over a large area, but such an effort would require costly addi-
tions to the transmission grid. To reduce CO2 emissions from the elec-
tric power sector is difficult, but California has successfully reduced its 
per capita use, primarily through conservation, to about one quarter of 
Wyoming’s per capita use, which is among the highest in the nation.539 
In 2001, the overall U.S. per capita GHG emissions was twenty tons per 
year, but California’s per capita emissions were eleven tons per year.540 
 Reducing the one-third of the CO2 emissions from fossil fuel com-
bustion that is created by the transportation sector is not a technically 
difficult challenge. Vehicles presently available for sale could end most 
of our dependence on foreign oil, and more efficient vehicles could be 
produced without the need for new technology to be developed. Re-
ducing the transportation sector’s petroleum consumption is primarily 
a political and social problem. To get Americans to reduce their energy-
consumptive lifestyle in order to reduce GHG emissions is the major 
challenge. Inefficient use of petroleum, exacerbated by domestic popu-
lation growth and increased foreign demand for oil helps drive prices 
upward and the value of the dollar down. The nation’s use of petro-
leum is an economic problem, an energy problem, a military problem, 
and a foreign policy problem. The world that was awash in inexpensive 
petroleum for a century now is gone, and other fossil fuel prices will 
continue to increase because they are linked to the price of petroleum. 
 The sooner we face the multifaceted problems created by the use 
of carbon-based fuels, the more likely a political consensus will emerge 
that may lead to solutions. While most efforts to date have failed, it is 
more alarming that even if the major international and domestic pro-
posals were implemented they would have only a modest positive effect. 
Only reductions in fossil fuel use significantly larger than those pro-
posed to date will have any chance for ultimately stabilizing atmos-
pheric CO2 concentrations. Whether the costs necessary to control CO2 
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emissions should be incurred will be a major scientific and political is-
sue in the coming decade. However, since CO2 released into the at-
mosphere has a residency time of perhaps 100 years, the costs that 
would be incurred today to prevent CO2 releases mostly will benefit fu-
ture generations that have little or no present political clout. 
 Reducing petroleum consumption should be a priority for the 
United States. Reducing the use of coal would help protect public 
health and the environment. The challenge is to do what needs to be 
done without unjustified adverse effects on the economy and without 
creating an intrusive bureaucracy that determines who can use energy 
and the amount that can be used. The legal system works best when it 
“tweaks” the system but allows the free market to work. GHGs as the 
primary causative factor in climate change need continued investiga-
tion, and any programs to control GHGs will need the flexibility to re-
spond appropriately to new information. The science of climate change 
is still based to a great extent on mathematical models that require con-
tinued verification and refinement. The changes needed to stabilize the 
atmosphere’s GHG concentrations will take many years to accomplish 
and require profound changes in how energy is utilized. However, it is 
important to begin to make serious, but prudent, efforts to control 
GHG emissions. Many states, local governments, trade associations, and 
corporations are not waiting for a federal response, but have taken the 
lead in responding to climate change. This should be encouraged. To 
address climate change will involve many small steps that in aggregate 
could help reduce our dependence on fossil fuels. While time may be 
needed to develop national leadership on this issue, progress can be 
achieved by focusing on the fact that energy efficiency saves money. 
 Congress needs to take a more responsible position concerning 
climate change and enact comprehensive legislation aimed at lowering 
carbon emissions. A carbon tax would be the best approach, but such 
legislation may be politically impossible to enact. The energy legislation 
recently enacted has been designed primarily to benefit the energy in-
dustry. This needs to change. Efforts to enact new legislation to deal 
with climate change have focused primarily on a cap-and-trade ap-
proach. The trading part is likely to be inflationary. It also could result 
in a massive transfer of wealth to the industries that use or produce fos-
sil fuels. The cap could have unintended consequences. It could lead to 
electric power brownouts and gasoline shortages, it would give a boost 
to nuclear energy, and it may lead to the kind of avoidance that appears 
to have occurred with the European Union’s cap-and-trade program. It 
also could encourage what manufacturing is left in the United States to 
move to foreign countries, and could lead to more importation of elec-
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tricity from Canada and perhaps Mexico. A substantial energy tax de-
signed to be as revenue neutral as possible would be a more effective 
approach, but no one program or piece of legislation is going to do the 
job. 
 An undesirable response would be to rely on the Clean Air Act be-
cause it is not a tool designed to deal with GHG emissions, or more 
specifically, CO2. The five Justices in the majority in Massachusetts v. EPA 
promulgated a decision that pressures EPA to limit combustion. It is 
difficult to believe that Congress intended EPA to be the czar of fossil 
energy use based on the Clean Air Act. To limit carbon dioxide re-
quires less fossil fuel to be combusted. This could be achieved through 
improvement in combustion efficiency, but the CAA does not provide 
EPA with the power or the ability to make this happen. Combustion of 
fossil fuels could be reduced by mandating the use of fuel-efficient mo-
tor vehicles, but Congress has a substantial track record of making only 
modest and ineffective use of this approach, and the CAA cannot easily 
be used to mandate fuel efficiency improvements. A motor vehicle pro-
gram that has both EPA and the Department of Transportation impos-
ing fuel efficiency standards would be ridiculous, but it would be con-
sistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. EPA could encourage the use 
of nuclear power, expanded use of hydroelectric power, or seek to ex-
pand the use of alternative energy. Such efforts are unlikely to be effec-
tive and would carry the EPA well beyond what most people would con-
sider the authority granted by the Clean Air Act and perhaps beyond 
what many people would consider the appropriate role of the Agency. 
EPA could achieve some of the goals of reduced fossil fuel combustion 
by making the Clean Air Act so onerous and expensive that the regu-
lated community would be forced to seek alternatives to the use of fos-
sil fuel. EPA lacks both the resources and the expertise to function ef-
fectively as the arbiter of energy use, and the potential for it to 
devastate the economy in the attempt to control GHG emissions is sub-
stantial. 
 The best hope for a viable program is that Congress will nullify 
Massachusetts v. EPA by creating an effective new program to reduce our 
dependence on carbon-based fuels without harming the economy. This 
may be overly sanguine. 
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